| LORD STEYN My Lords,      The way in which this appeal comes before the House must be
        kept in mind. Spain took preliminary steps under the Extradition Act 1989 to obtain the
        extradition of General Pinochet, the former Head of State of Chile, in respect of crimes
        which he allegedly committed between 11 September 1973 and March 1990 when he ceased to be
        the President of Chile. General Pinochet applied to the Divisional Court for a ruling that
        he is entitled to immunity as a former Head of State from criminal and civil process in
        the English courts. He obtained a ruling to that effect. If that ruling is correct, the
        extradition proceedings are at an end. The issues came to the Divisional Court in advance
        of the receipt of a particularized request for extradition by Spain. Such a request has
        now been received. Counsel for General Pinochet has argued that the House ought to refuse
        to admit the request in evidence. In my view it would be wrong to ignore the material put
        forward in Spain's formal request for extradition. This case ought to be decided on the
        basis of all the relevant materials before the House. And that involves also taking into
        account the further evidence lodged on behalf of General Pinochet.      In an appeal in which no fewer than 16 barristers were involved
        over six days it is not surprising that issues proliferated. Some of the issues do not
        need to be decided. For example, there was as an issue as to the date upon which General
        Pinochet became the Head of State of Chile. He undoubtedly became the Head of State at
        least by 26 June 1974; and I will assume that from the date of the coup d'etat on 11
        September 1973 he was the Head of State. Rather than attempt to track down every other
        hare that has been started, I will concentrate my observations on three central issues,
        namely (1) the nature of the charges brought by Spain against General Pinochet; (2) the
        question whether he is entitled to former Head of State immunity under the applicable
        statutory provisions; (3) if he is not entitled to such immunity, the different question
        whether under the common law act of state doctrine the House ought to declare that the
        matters involved are not justiciable in our courts. This is not the order in which counsel
        addressed the issues but the advantage of so considering the issues is considerable. One
        can only properly focus on the legal issues before the House when there is clarity about
        the nature of the charges in respect of which General Pinochet seeks to establish immunity
        or seeks to rely on the act of state doctrine. Logically, immunity must be examined before
        act of state. The act of state issue will only arise if the court decides that the
        defendant does not have immunity. And I shall attempt to show that the construction of the
        relevant statutory provisions relating to immunity has a bearing on the answer to the
        separate question of act of state.  The case against General Pinochet      In the Divisional Court the Lord Chief Justice summarized the
        position by saying that the thrust of the warrant "makes it plain that the applicant
        is charged not with personally torturing or murdering victims or ordering their
        disappearance, but with using the power of the State to that end". Relying on the
        information contained in the request for extradition, it is necessary to expand the
        cryptic account of the facts in the warrant. The request alleges a systematic campaign of
        repression against various groups in Chile after the military coup on 11 September 1973.
        The case is that of the order of 4,000 individuals were killed or simply disappeared. Such
        killings and disappearances mostly took place in Chile but some also took place in various
        countries abroad. Such acts were committed during the period from 11 September 1973 until
        1990. The climax of the repression was reached in 1974 and 1975. The principal
        instrumentality of the oppression was the Direction de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), the
        secret police. The subsequent re-naming of this organization is immaterial. The case is
        that agents of DINA, who were specially trained in torture techniques, tortured victims on
        a vast scale in secret torture chambers in Santiago and elsewhere in Chile. The torturers
        were invariably dressed in civilian clothes. Hooded doctors were present during torture
        sessions. The case is not one of interrogators acting in excess of zeal. The case goes
        much further. The request explains:  
           "The most usual method was "the grill" consisting of a metal table
            on which the victim was laid naked and his extremities tied and electrical shocks were
            applied to the lips, genitals, wounds or metal prosthesis; also two persons, relatives or
            friends, were placed in two metal drawers one on top of the other so that when the one
            above was tortured the psychological impact was felt by the other; on other occasions the
            victim was suspended from a bar by the wrists and/or the knees, and over a prolonged
            period while held in this situation electric current was applied to him, cutting wounds
            were inflicted or he was beaten; or the "dry submarine" method was applied, i.e.
            placing a bag on the head until close to suffocation, also drugs were used and boiling
            water was thrown on various detainees to punish them as a foretaste for the death which
            they would later suffer."  As the Divisional Court observed it is not alleged that General Pinochet personally
        committed any of these acts by his own hand. The case is, however, that agents of DINA
        committed the acts of torture and that DINA was directly answerable to General Pinochet
        rather than to the military junta. And the case is that DINA undertook and arranged the
        killings, disappearances and torturing of victims on the orders of General Pinochet. In
        other words, what is alleged against General Pinochet is not constructive criminal
        responsibility. The case is that he ordered and procured the criminal acts which the
        warrant and request for extradition specify. óKóóKThe allegations have not been tested
        in a court of law. The House is not required to examine the correctness of the
        allegations. The House must assume the correctness of the allegations as the backcloth of
        the questions of law arising on this appeal.  The former Head of State immunity      It is now possible to turn to the point of general public
        importance involved in the Divisional Court's decision, namely "the proper
        interpretation and scope of the immunity enjoyed by a former Head of State from arrest and
        extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom in respect of acts committed while he was
        Head of State". It is common ground that a Head of State while in office has an
        absolute immunity against civil or criminal proceedings in the English courts. If General
        Pinochet had still been Head of State of Chile, he would be immune from the present
        extradition proceedings. But he has ceased to be a Head of State. He claims immunity as a
        former Head of State. Counsel for General Pinochet relied on provisions contained in Part
        I of the State Immunity Act 1978. Part I does not apply to criminal proceedings: see
        Section 16(4). It is irrelevant to the issues arising on this appeal. The only arguable
        basis for such an immunity originates in Section 20 of the Act of 1978. It provides as
        follows:  
           "Subject to the provisions of this section and to any necessary
            modifications, the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 shall apply to-  (a) a
            sovereign or other head of State.  (b) members of his family forming part of his
            household; and  (c) his private servants.  as it applies to the head of a
            diplomatic mission, to members of his family forming part of his household and to his
            private servants."  It is therefore necessary to turn to the relevant provisions of the Diplomatic
        Privileges Act 1964. The relevant provisions are contained in Articles 31, 38 and 39 of
        the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which in part forms Schedule 1 to the Act of
        1964. Article 31 provides that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from criminal
        jurisdiction in the receiving state. Article 38(1) reads as follows:  
           "Except in so far as additional privileges and immunities may be granted by
            the receiving State, a diplomatic agent who is a national of or permanently resident in
            that State shall enjoy only immunity from jurisdiction and inviolability in respect of official
            acts performed in the exercise of his functions."
                    (My emphasis)  Article 39 so far as it is relevant reads as follows:  
           "1. Every person entitled to privileges and immunities shall enjoy them from
            the moment he enters the territory of the receiving State . . . . .  2. When the
            functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to an end, such
            privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country or
            on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so but shall subsist until that time even
            in case of armed conflict. However, with respect to acts performed by such a person in
            the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to
            subsist."         (My emphasis)  Given the different roles of a member of a diplomatic mission and a Head of State, as
        well as the fact that a diplomat principally acts in the receiving state whereas a Head of
        State principally acts in his own country, the legislative technique of applying Article
        39(2) to former a Head of State is somewhat confusing. How the necessary modifications
        required by Section 20 of the Act of 1978 are to be achieved is not entirely
        straightforward. Putting to one side the immunity of a serving Head of State, my view is
        that Section 20 of the 1978 Act, read with the relevant provisions of the schedule to the
        1964 Act, should be read as providing that a former Head of State shall enjoy immunity
        from the criminal jurisdiction of the United Kingdom with respect to his official acts
        performed in the exercise of his functions as Head of State. That was the synthesis of the
        convoluted provisions helpfully offered by Mr Lloyd-Jones, who appeared as amicus
        curiae. Neither counsel for General Pinochet nor counsel for the Spanish Government
        questioned this formulation. For my part it is the only sensible reconstruction of the
        legislative intent. It is therefore plain that statutory immunity in favour of a former
        Head of State is not absolute. It requires the coincidence of two requirements: (1) that
        the defendant is a former Head of State (ratione personae in the vocabulary of
        international law) and (2) that he is charged with official acts performed in the exercise
        of his functions as a Head of State (ratione materiae). In regard to the second
        requirement it is not sufficient that official acts are involved: the acts must also have
        been performed by the defendant in the exercise of his functions as Head of State.      On the assumption that the allegations of fact contained in the
        warrant and the request are true, the central question is whether those facts must be
        regarded as official acts performed in the exercise of the functions of a Head of State.
        The Lord Chief Justice observed that a former Head of State is clearly entitled to
        immunity from process in respect of some crimes. I would accept this proposition.
        Rhetorically, The Lord Chief Justice then posed the question: "Where does one draw
        the line?" After a detailed review of the case law and literature, he concluded that
        even in respect of acts of torture the former Head of State immunity would prevail. That
        amounts to saying that there is no or virtually no line to be drawn. Collins J. went
        further. He said:  
           "The submission was made that it could never be in the exercise of such
            functions to commit crimes as serious as those allegedly committed by the applicant.
            Unfortunately history shows that it has indeed on occasions been state policy to
            exterminate or to oppress particular groups. One does not have look very far back in
            history to see examples of the sort of thing having happened. There is in my judgment no
            justification for reading any limitation based on the nature of the crimes committed into
            the immunity which exists."  It is inherent in this stark conclusion that there is no or virtually no line to be
        drawn. It follows that when Hitler ordered the "final solution" his act must be
        regarded as an official act deriving from the exercise of his functions as Head of State.
        That is where the reasoning of the Divisional Court inexorably leads. Counsel for General
        Pinochet submitted that this conclusion is the inescapable result of the statutory
        wording.      My Lords, the concept of an individual acting in his capacity
        as Head of State involves a rule of law which must be applied to the facts of a particular
        case. It invites classification of the circumstances of a case as falling on a particular
        side of the line. It contemplates at the very least that some acts of a Head of State may
        fall beyond even the most enlarged meaning of official acts performed in the exercise of
        the functions of a Head of State. If a Head of State kills his gardener in a fit of rage
        that could by no stretch of the imagination be described as an act performed in the
        exercise of his functions as Head of State. If a Head of State orders victims to be
        tortured in his presence for the sole purpose of enjoying the spectacle of the pitiful
        twitchings of victims dying in agony (what Montaigne described as the farthest point that
        cruelty can reach) that could not be described as acts undertaken by him in the exercise
        of his functions as a Head of State. Counsel for General Pinochet expressly, and rightly,
        conceded that such crimes could not be classified as official acts undertaken in the
        exercise of the functions of a Head of State. These examples demonstrate that there is
        indeed a meaningful line to be drawn.      How and where the line is to be drawn requires further
        examination. Is this question to be considered from the vantage point of the municipal law
        of Chile, where most of the acts were committed, or in the light of the principles of
        customary international law? Municipal law cannot be decisive as to where the line is to
        be drawn. If it were the determining factor, the most abhorrent municipal laws might be
        said to enlarge the functions of a Head of State. But I need not dwell on the point
        because it is conceded on behalf of General Pinochet that the distinction between official
        acts performed in the exercise of functions as a Head of State and acts not satisfying
        these requirements must depend on the rules of international law. It was at one stage
        argued that international law spells out no relevant criteria and is of no assistance. In
        my view that is not right. Negatively, the development of international law since the
        Second World War justifies the conclusion that by the time of the 1973 coup d'etat, and
        certainly ever since, international law condemned genocide, torture, hostage taking and
        crimes against humanity (during an armed conflict or in peace time) as international
        crimes deserving of punishment. Given this state of international law, it seems to me
        difficult to maintain that the commission of such high crimes may amount to acts performed
        in the exercise of the functions of a Head of State.      The essential fragility of the claim to immunity is underlined
        by the insistence on behalf of General Pinochet that it is not alleged that he
        "personally" committed any of the crimes. That means that he did not commit the
        crimes by his own hand. It is apparently conceded that if he personally tortured victims
        the position would be different. This distinction flies in the face of an elementary
        principle of law, shared by all civilized legal systems, that there is no distinction to
        be drawn between the man who strikes, and a man who orders another to strike. It is
        inconceivable that in enacting the Act of 1978 Parliament would have wished to rest the
        statutory immunity of a former Head of State on a different basis.      On behalf of General Pinochet it was submitted that acts by
        police, intelligence officers and military personnel are paradigm official acts. In this
        absolute form I do not accept the proposition. For example, why should what was allegedly
        done in secret in the torture chambers of Santiago on the orders of General Pinochet be
        regarded as official acts? Similarly, why should the murders and disappearances allegedly
        perpetrated by DINA in secret on the orders of General Pinochet be regarded as official
        acts? But, in any event, in none of these cases is the further essential requirement
        satisfied, viz. that in an international law sense these acts were part of the functions
        of a Head of State. The normative principles of international law do not require that such
        high crimes should be classified as acts performed in the exercise of the functions of a
        Head of State. For my part I am satisfied that as a matter of construction of the relevant
        statutory provisions the charges brought by Spain against General Pinochet are properly to
        be classified as conduct falling beyond the scope of his functions as Head of State.
        Qualitatively, what he is alleged to have done is no more to be categorized as acts
        undertaken in the exercise of the functions of a Head of State than the examples already
        given of a Head of State murdering his gardener or arranging the torture of his opponents
        for the sheer spectacle of it. It follows that in my view General Pinochet has no
        statutory immunity.      Counsel for General Pinochet further argued that if he is not
        entitled to statutory immunity, he is nevertheless entitled to immunity under customary
        international law. International law recognizes no such wider immunity in favour of a
        former Head of State. In any event, if there had been such an immunity under international
        law Section 20, read with Article 39(2), would have overridden it. General Pinochet is not
        entitled to an immunity of any kind.  The act of state doctrine      Counsel for General Pinochet submitted that, even if he fails
        to establish the procedural bar of statutory immunity, the House ought to uphold his
        challenge to the validity of the warrant on the ground of the act of state doctrine. They
        argued that the validity of the warrant and propriety of the extradition proceedings
        necessarily involve an investigation by the House of governmental or official acts which
        largely took place in Chile. They relied on the explanation of the doctrine of act of
        state by Lord Wilberforce in Buttes Gas and Oil Co v. Hammer [1982] A.C. 888.
        Counsel for General Pinochet further put forward wide-ranging political arguments about
        the consequences of the extradition proceedings, such as adverse internal consequences in
        Chile and damage to the relations between the United Kingdom and Chile. Plainly it is not
        appropriate for the House to take into account such political considerations. And the same
        applies to the argument suggesting past "acquiescence" by the United Kingdom
        government.      Concentrating on the legal arguments, I am satisfied that there
        are several reasons why the act of state doctrine is inapplicable. First the House is not
        being asked to investigate, or pass judgment on, the facts alleged in the warrant or
        request for extradition. The task of the House is simply to take note of the allegations
        and to consider and decide the legal issues of immunity and act of state. Secondly, the
        issue of act of state must be approached on the basis that the intent of Parliament was
        not to give statutory immunity to a former Head of State in respect of the systematic
        torture and killing of his fellow citizens. The ground of this conclusion is that such
        high crimes are not official acts committed in the exercise of the functions of a Head of
        State. In those circumstances it cannot be right for the House to enunciate an enlarged
        act of state doctrine, stretching far beyond anything said in Buttes Gas, to
        protect a former Head of State from the consequences of his private crimes. Thirdly, any
        act of state doctrine is displaced by Section 134(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 in
        relation to torture and Section (1)(1) of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 . Both Acts
        provide for the taking of jurisdiction over foreign governmental acts. Fourthly, and more
        broadly, the Spanish authorities have relied on crimes of genocide, torture, hostage
        taking and crimes against humanity. It has in my view been clearly established that by
        1973 such acts were already condemned as high crimes by customary international law. In
        these circumstances it would be wrong for the English courts now to extend the act of
        state doctrine in a way which runs counter to the state of customary international law as
        it existed in 1973. Since the act of state doctrine depends on public policy as perceived
        by the courts in the forum at the time of the suit the developments since 1973 are also
        relevant and serve to reinforce my view. I would endorse the observation in the Third
        Restatement of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, published in 1986 by the
        American Law Institute, Volume 1, at 370, to the effect that: "A claim arising out of
        an alleged violation of fundamental human rights--for instance, a claim on behalf of a
        victim of torture or genocide--would (if otherwise sustainable) probably not be defeated
        by the act of state doctrine, since the accepted international law of human rights is well
        established and contemplates external scrutiny of such acts." But in adopting this
        formulation I would remove the word "probably" and substitute
        "generally." Finally, I must make clear that my conclusion does not involve the
        expression of any view on the interesting arguments on universality of jurisdiction in
        respect of certain international crimes and related jurisdictional questions. Those
        matters do not arise for decision.      I conclude that the act of state doctrine is inapplicable.  Conclusions      My Lords, since the hearing in the Divisional Court the case
        has in a number of ways been transformed. The nature of the case against General Pinochet
        is now far clearer. And the House has the benefit of valuable submissions from
        distinguished international lawyers. In the light of all the material now available I have
        been persuaded that the conclusion of the Divisional Court was wrong. For the reasons I
        have given I would allow the appeal.  
 LORD HOFFMANN  My Lords,      I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my
        noble and learned friend Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead and for the reasons he gives I too
        would allow this appeal.  
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 Lord Lloyd of Berwick         
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