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Violence, Fear, and Insecurity among the Urban Poor in Latin America

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Over the past decade, accelerating rates of violence and crime in Latin American cities have transformed the problem of individual criminal pathology into a serious development constraint. The problem is not limited to urban areas—the region is one of the most violent of the world—but it is particularly problematic in urban areas, where the relationship between violence and poverty is neither unidirectional nor straightforward. In urban areas in Latin America and the Caribbean, the poor are the most likely to both be seriously affected by crime violence and be held responsible for the crime and violence committed. This presents challenges for identifying successful urban-focused violence reduction interventions.

This chapter first looks at categories of violence, introducing an urban violence roadmap. It then discusses the measurement, trends, and characteristics of urban violence. The third section examines the causes, costs, and consequences of the phenomenon, particularly among the urban poor. The last section reviews a range of current national and sector-level violence-reduction interventions, particularly those focusing on the urban poor.

A Roadmap of Categories and Manifestations of Urban Crime and Violence

The sheer scale of violence in the *barrios* (slums) of Latin American cities means that violence has become "routinized" or "normalized" into the

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functional reality of daily life (Poppovic and Pinheiro 1995; Koonings 1999; Scheper-Hughes 1995.) Different "banal" or "ubiquitous" manifestations of violence overlap to form a complex layering of multiple practices (Schrijvers 1993; Pecaut 1999; Torres Rivas 1999). But what does violence actually mean? In its recent *Global Report on Violence*, the World Health Organization (WHO) defines it as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation" (WHO 2002, p. 5).[1] Most definitions recognize that violence involves the exercise of power that is invariably used to legitimate the use of force for specific gains (Keane 1996).

Definitions of violence overlap with definitions of conflict and crime, but there are important distinctions. While violence and conflict are both concerned with power, conflict-based power struggles do not necessarily inflict physical or mental harm on others, while violence by its very nature does.[2]

In recent years violent crime as a proportion of total crimes committed has increased in much of Latin America. For example, in 1995 violent crime accounted for almost half of all reported crime in Nicaragua, where crimes against life almost tripled in a single year, rising from 9,392 in 1997 to 25,804 in 1998 (Call 2000; Rodgers 1999). Crimes against property declined during 6 of the 11 years between 1985 and 1994, but homicides increased considerably over the same period (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002). It is thus not crime per se but the lethality associated with it that is the critical issue.

The range of types of urban violence and crime is both complex and context specific. In an urban community in Jamaica, local residents in a participatory assessment listed 19 types of violence, including political, gang, economic, interpersonal, and domestic disputes. Poor urban communities in Guatemala identified an average of 41 types of violence and crime; in Colombia the figure was 25 (Moser and Holland 1997; Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 2001).

It is therefore helpful to categorize types of violence, highlighting those that are overwhelmingly urban in nature. These vary by country and discipline. For instance, Colombian experts distinguish between geographically confined rural violence (*la violencia del monte*) and urban violence (*la violencia de la calle*) (Deas 1998), with intraurban differentiations between violence in private arenas (*violencia en la casa*) and violence in public arenas (*violencia en la calle*) (Jimeno and Roldán 1996). Other dichotomies include political and nonpolitical violence; political, criminal, and social violence (Chernick 1998); political, economic, and intrafamilial violence (Carrión 1994); and the Inter-American Development Bank's distinction

between criminal and social violence at the individual, household, and community levels (Buvinić, Morrison, and Shifter 1999).

This chapter distinguishes between political, institutional, economic, and social violence, based on the primary motivation behind the violence identified.[3] Since any categorization is static, this typology is a continuum, with important reinforcing linkages between different types of violence. From the perspective of the social actors, the same act can be committed for different reasons. This categorization provides the framework for a roadmap of the predominant categories, types, and manifestations of everyday violence in Latin American cities (table 4.1).

An Urban Violence Profile: Trends, Similarities, and Differences

While violence is present in much of the daily reality of life in Latin America and the Caribbean, its nature and extent varies significantly, both between and within countries. This section reviews trends and discusses the different manifestations of urban violence.

Trends in Urban Violence

The level of violence is extraordinarily high in Latin America and the Caribbean. Worldwide the homicide rate is 5.1 per 100,000 inhabitants, and a rate of more than 10 is generally considered dangerously high (Call 2000). In Latin America in 2000 the homicide rate was 27.5, the highest for any region in the world (WHO 2002).

Within the region, the level of violence varies greatly. Overall, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia consistently have the highest homicide rates in the region, while Argentina and Chile have rates far below the regional average, even below the worldwide average of 5.1. Chile's homicide rate in 1994 was 2.5, while the rate in El Salvador was 164. Although the annual homicide rate in El Salvador fell to about 80–90 per 100,000 by 1999, it still far exceeded the regional average (Call 2000). Over the same period Colombia's homicide rate was 50–60 per 100,000 (World Vision 2002).

Although high levels of violence are a relatively recent phenomenon—with notable exceptions, such as Colombia—violence is now firmly established among the top five causes of death in much of Latin America, and it is the leading cause of death in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, and Venezuela. Violence caused more deaths in Colombia between 1986 and 1996 than HIV/AIDS did in all of Latin America (Briceño-León 1999).

Table 4.1 Urban violence in Latin America and the Caribbean takes many forms

Primary direction of violence continuum	*Category of violence*	*Types of violence by perpetrators or victims*	*Manifestations*	*Secondary direction of violence continuum*
	Political	State and non-state violence in situations of political conflict	Guerrilla and paramilitary conflict Armed conflict between political parties Political assassinations	
	Institutional	Violence by the state and other "informal" institutions, including the private sector	Extrajudicial killings by security forces State- or community-directed social cleansing Lynching	*State institutional violence resulting in lack of trust in police and judiciary system*
Intrahousehold social violence results in youths leaving the home and at risk to variety of street violence	Economic/institutional	Organized crime Protection of business interests	Kidnapping Armed robbery Drug trafficking Car theft Small arms dealing Trafficking in prostitutes Intimidation and violence as means of resolving economic disputes	
	Economic	Delinquency, robbery	Street theft and robbery	

Table 4.1 (continued)

Primary direction of violence continuum	*Category of violence*	*Types of violence by perpetrators or victims*	*Manifestations*	*Secondary direction of violence continuum*
	Economic/ social	Youth gangs	Collective "turf" violence Robbery and theft	
	Economic/ social	Street children (boys and girls)	Petty theft	
	Social	Domestic violence between adults	Physical, sexual, or psychological abuse	*State institutional violence resulting in lack of trust in police and judiciary system*
	Social	Child abuse	Physical and sexual abuse, particularly in the home	
Intrahousehold social violence results in youths leaving the home and at risk to variety of street violence	Social	Intergenerational conflict between parents and children (both young and adults)	Physical and psychological abuse	
	Social	Gratuitous and routine daily violence	Lack of citizenship in areas such as traffic, road rage, bar fights, and street confrontations	

Source: Adapted from Moser and Winton 2002.

Box 4.1 The Difficulty of Measuring Crime and Violence

Measuring crime and violence is difficult. Broad proxy measures of violence generally include mortality statistics; official crime statistics (generally police data); murder or intentional injury statistics, including death certificates (from hospitals and morticians); and judicial records, such as offender rates and surveys (Arriagada and Godoy 2000; Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999; see table 4A.2). These measures are limited by underreporting and difficulties in interpretation (Short 1997). In addition, national and regional differences in data collection methods, recall periods, and cultural definitions of crime and violence make it difficult to make valid cross-country comparisons. Only a fraction of victims of domestic and sexual violence report the crimes, and in some places distrust and the inefficiency of police and judicial systems discourage people from reporting nonfatal crimes, especially in poorer areas (Dammert 2000.) Looking at homicide figures alone is misleading, since they do not reflect the range of nonfatal violence.

Victimization survey data often offer a useful comparative tool with which to complement and balance official figures, although they rarely provide comparable regional level data. Two comparative surveys of Latin America are Latinobarometro, a public opinion survey of 17 Latin American countries, conducted annually since 1995, and the 1996 ACTIVA study, carried out by the Pan-American Health Organizations (PAHO) in eight cities of Latin America and Spain.

Within countries, violence today is usually most severe in large urban areas. Differences in urban homicide levels across the region are striking, however, with rates ranging from 6.4 per 100,000 in Buenos Aires to 248.0 per 100,000 in Medellín (Piquet Carneiro 2000). Caracas, Lima, Mexico City, and Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo account for more than half the total of their national homicides (Briceño-León 1999). Venezuela's homicide rate increased 226 percent between 1986 and 1997, but 478 percent in Caracas (Sanjuán 1998).

Latinobarometro data on the relationship between city size and crime rates show that a city's demographic growth rate is a stronger indicator of its crime rate than its size. Between 1979 and 1998 the homicide rate in metropolitan Rio de Janeiro rose a relatively modest 35 percent, while that of fast-growing metropolitan São Paulo rose 103 percent (Piquet Carneiro 2000). In Bogotá, Colombia, homicide levels have declined since the mid-1990s to levels that are relatively low in the national urban context, and homicides are now concentrated in a few small, very violent areas (Llorente and others 2001). While victimization increased overall with city size in Colombia, robbery was most common in Bogotá (the

largest city); homicide and assaults were more common in mid-size cities, especially Cali and Medellín (Gaviria and Pagés 1999).

Differences in rural-urban violence levels are most marked in postconflict countries, where rural violence is often still more widespread than urban violence. In El Salvador 76 percent of homicides occur in rural areas (World Vision 2002; Cruz and Beltrán 2000). In Guatemala the homicide rate is 101.5 in Guatemala City, but more rural departments show still higher rates, with the highest rate of 165 recorded in the department of Escuintla (Rodríguez and de León 2000).

Within Latin American cities, disparities in violence levels are based on neighborhood income levels. More prosperous areas suffer from property-related violent crime, such as vehicle theft (Gaviria and Pagés 1999; IESA/FLACSO 1999), while severe violence is generally concentrated in lower income areas. Violent crime rates are particularly high in poor neighborhoods on the peripheries of cities (Briceño-Leon and Zubillaga 2002; Fundación Mexicana para la Salud/Centro de Economía y Salud 1998; Lira 2000; Reyna and Toche 1999; Zaluar 1999). However, increases in vehicle robbery, which sometimes includes murder, have heightened personal insecurity among wealthier populations (Piquet Carneiro 2000). Increases in violent robbery only partially account for the increase in the homicide rate, suggesting that in a significant proportion of homicides, the victim knows the aggressor (IESA/FLACSO 1999).

Violence rates also vary based on age and gender, with young men most likely to be both victims and perpetrators. Rates of violence were higher for men than for women in six of the seven cities in the ACTIVA study (Cruz 1999). In Brazil the estimated homicide rate in 1999 among men 15–24 was 86.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, while the rate for young women was 6.5 (PAHO n.d). In Puerto Rico the homicide rate for men 15–29 was 101, while the rate for women the same age was 6.8 (WHO 2002).

The type of violence is an important predictor of victimization by gender. In Peru young women are more likely to be victims of robbery than young men, while the victims of physical aggression are predominantly young men (Instituto Apoyo 1999). In Argentina 47 percent of those accused of homicide in 1997 were between 18 and 29, and nearly 10 percent were under 18 (Arriagada and Godoy 1999). Thus even in countries with relatively low levels of violence, juvenile violence among boys and young men is both rising and growing in intensity (Dammert 2000).

Categories of Urban Violence

While homicide and victimization statistics illustrate the scale of violence, they say little about the differing characteristics of the phenomenon. Visibility

is critical in shaping levels of tolerance, fear, and insecurity. In much of urban Latin America, drug-related and organized crime, as well as the robberies committed by juvenile delinquents and gangs, attract considerable media attention. In contrast, social violence, including gender-based domestic violence, child abuse, and intergenerational conflict, is less visible and therefore has a lower profile in terms of public opinion. Given the extensive range of types of violence, this chapter can provide only a brief overview of the categories of violence that particularly impact on the urban poor.

Economic Violence: Organized Crime and Gangs

With the increasing dominance and grip of the drug trade over Latin American cities, organized drug-related crime is the most worrisome phenomenon, particularly in large capital cities. While the "drug problem" is primarily viewed as a national or international drug production or trafficking problem, the escalation of drug-related violence in low-income urban areas is closely linked not only to trafficking but also to high levels of drug consumption. Brazil, for example, is now the second-largest consumer of cocaine and cocaine derivatives after the United States, and the poor have become the main consumers. Drugs are integral to a variety of forms of violence, including gang warfare (to control the drug market), robberies and assaults (to purchase drugs), constant (often violent) quarrels in the home among drug users and their families, and the murder of drug addicts by "social cleansing" groups (Moser and McIlwaine 2003). Of these forms of crime, gang warfare is most associated with the drug trade.

With killings shifting from kidnappings and disappearances in the mid-1990s to armed attacks in public areas throughout the city, both intended targets and innocent bystanders are now victims, and what was once a remote threat of drug-related violence has now become a real fear for the general population (U.S. State Department 2002). In Rio de Janeiro in 2002, the local government's attempt to intervene in gang activities resulted in the bombing of the city hall and the closing down of the city itself (Sives 2002; Leeds 1996). Increasingly local community dynamics can be entirely transformed by drug gangs (Rodgers 2003); in some cases drug groups have taken control of the local institutional structures of entire poor urban communities. In such contexts the state often increases its mechanisms of control in an attempt to counteract the growing power of drug barons. The targeting of low-income communities by state security forces in the fight against drugs highlights the fact that it is the low-level, not the high-level, actors who are vulnerable (Leeds 1996).

In the *favelas* of urban Brazil, drug groups impose their own systems of justice, with the presence of drug barons legitimized through com-

plex reciprocal and, to a degree, mutually beneficial relationships. The drug lord is given anonymity and freedom to conduct business; in return the community receives internal security and often a range of services, such as money to pay for medical treatment, soup kitchens, and day care centers. The services provided are valuable only because the state does not provide them and because the state entities charged with providing essential security services act as a corrupt and repressive force.

In Colombia drug traffickers have played a distinct but indirect role in the escalation of violence (Gaviria 1998). Although only 10 percent of homicides are directly associated with drug trafficking, the trade indirectly generates high levels of everyday violence through various criminal externalities. These include congestion in law enforcement, the supply of weapons, and the creation of a culture that favors easy money and violent conflict resolution over more traditional values, particularly among urban youth.

Increasingly, youth gangs, long seen as the main source of urban Latin American violence, have become linked to drugs.[4] Youth gangs, some highly formalized, others very loosely structured, have been identified in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. In Central America, where gangs known as *maras* have a distinct structure, the *maras* 18 and Salvatrucha operate throughout the region. In Guatemala City in 1997 the Prensa Libre identified 53 *maras* operating in 12 zones (UNDP 1998); another source put the figure at 330 *maras* in 1995 (PRODEN 1996). In Honduras a nationwide register lists 340 gangs, with a membership level of almost 15,000 young people between 11 and 30; people working with juvenile offenders estimate the number at close to 60,000 (Castellanos 2000). In Medellín, Colombia, there are reportedly about 200 gangs of young people between 12 and 22 (Arriagada and Godoy 1999). In Peru more than 1,000 youth gangs were reported to have committed 13,000 criminal offenses between 1996 and 1998 (Reyna and Toche 1999).

Traditionally, youth gangs have had both social functions (related to youth identity and exclusion and linked to territorial control or neighborhood protection) and economic functions (related to illicit economic gain from robbery). Increasingly however, the divide between youth gangs and organized narco-crime is disappearing. In Brazil, for example, children as young as six and seven are hired as lookouts and carriers, often paid in crack cocaine or other drugs.

Violent robbery has also increased dramatically across the region. This includes street crime such as mugging, armed robbery, and kidnapping, all of which are committed by organized groups as well as individual delinquents and robbers. In 1999, most robberies in Lima occurred in the

street (62 percent) a significant number took place on public transport (15 percent) and in the market (12 percent) (Instituto Apoyo 1999).

Kidnapping is one of the most important activities undertaken by organized criminal gangs. In El Salvador reported kidnappings increased from 97 cases in 1998 to 179 in 1999, dropping to 114 in 2000, while they increased 200 percent in Ecuador between 2000 and 2001 (World Vision 2002).[5] Although victims are generally presumed to belong to higher socioeconomic groups, victimization has become more generalized in recent years in Guatemala, affecting different segments of the population (UNDP 1998).

The incidence of much organized violence is, in part, attributable to past civil conflict in the region. In some but not all cases, demobilized ex-combatants have formed armed bands. Guatemala is estimated to have some 600 organized crime gangs, with 20,000 members. Most of these gangs are headed by ex-army officials (UNDP 1998). In Nicaragua armed bands made up of former *contras* engage in kidnapping for ransom and armed robbery in the north and north-central regions of the country (U.S. Department of State 2001). In Jamaica armed gangs involved in the trafficking of narcotics and guns control many inner-city neighborhoods. Better equipped than the police, they have targeted security patrols, police officers, and their families (U.S. Department of State 2002).

Millions of predominantly urban poor people face daily violence on public transportation. Recent surveys of Brazil reveal that 45 percent of respondents in San José, Costa Rica; 66 percent in Santiago, Chile; and 91 percent in Salvador de Bahia, Brazil fear violence on public transportation. Their fears are not unfounded: assaults on buses are common, with robbers boarding buses to assault passengers and even murder the driver or anyone who resists.

Institutional Violence

In some contexts state security forces use extrajudicial systems of informal justice, commonly known as "social cleansing," to retain order and power. Levels of police brutality are high, and such institutional violence usually goes unpunished. Much police brutality occurs in urban areas, where it is often racially motivated. In Venezuela state and private security forces were responsible for 241 extrajudicial killings between October 2000 and September 2001. Such "social cleansing" is often targeted at "undesirable" groups, which include suspected criminals, members of youth gangs, street children, and homosexuals. In situations of seemingly uncontrollable violence, the populace increasingly supports such extralegal activities by the police (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002).

It is not just the police who are involved in the application of arbitrary justice. In the face of insufficient state protection or resources to enlist private security, many residents of marginal urban areas believe there is no option but to resort to rudimentary vigilantism (Arriagada and Godoy 1999). Established vigilante groups are a powerful presence in many low-income urban communities in Latin America. In Venezuela a vigilante group known as the *grupo exterminio* (extermination group) was reportedly responsible for up to 100 killings between mid-2000 and 2001 in the cities of Acarigua and Araure (U.S. Department of State 2002). In poor urban settings, these informal justice systems often result in collusion between nonstate and state social actors, particularly the police. With allegations difficult to prove, it is easy for such deaths to be passed off as the result of intergang rivalry or drug trafficking. This is a particular problem in the case of the murder of urban street children and other "undesirable" youth (see www.casa-alianza.org).

Social Violence, Including Gender-Based Domestic Violence, Rape, and Child Abuse

Most violence against women takes place in the home, as physical, psychological, or sexual abuse; violence against women also occurs outside the home, in the form of assaults and rape. Although reporting rates for domestic and sexual violence are extremely low, Arriagada and Godoy (1999) estimate that half of all Latin American women have been subjected to abuse at home at some point in their lives.

Given the reluctance to report such offenses, survey data are a more reliable source of comparative data than reported incidents. Survey data cited by the WHO (2002) suggest that Latin America has the highest rates of sexual assaults against women of any region in the South. A national survey in Peru found that at least 41 percent of women reported having been battered by their partner during 2000, with 16 percent of these women reporting being beaten regularly (U.S. Department of State 2002). Survey data from seven studies in Latin American cities show high rates of sexual assault by a partner, ranging from 10.1 percent of respondents in São Paulo to 46.7 percent in Cusco, Peru (WHO 2002; table 4A.3). Violence within the home can be deadly: a 1993 PAHO study found that 45–60 percent of homicides against women were carried out at home, the majority by partners (UNDP 1999).

Across the region important differences are evident between the levels of visibility and the levels of tolerance of domestic violence. In Nicaragua domestic violence has a very high profile, with child violence and sexual abuse also receiving widespread media coverage. In Chile public awareness campaigns and legal reform led to an impressive 75,559 cases being presented in the courts in 1999 (U.S. Department of State 2002). In countries

without such high-profile campaigns, or inadequate judicial procedures, domestic violence is still often treated as a private issue. Indeed, although laws against domestic violence now exist in most of Latin America, many are deficient or inadequately implemented.

Two large Nicaraguan studies of intrafamily domestic violence show that wife abuse was associated with poverty, low education, having 4 or more children, and living in an urban area (Ellsberg 1997; INEC/MINSA 1998). The surveys show that in 50–60 percent of cases, children witness the violence, with significant repercussions. Children of abused mothers are twice as likely to suffer from emotional, learning, or behavioral problems and seven times more likely to be abused themselves.

Of all the types of sexual violence against women, rape is the most hidden. Reported levels vary from just 277 cases in El Salvador to 1,181 in Nicaragua and more than 3,600 in Venezuela (U.S. Department of State 2001, 2002). It is unlikely that such a vast disparity actually exists. According to the Permanent Commission of the Rights of Women and Children in Peru, there are 25,000 rapes in Peru a year (U.S. Department of State 2002). The United Nations Development Programme recorded a rate of 109.7 rapes per 100,000 women over the age of 15 in Nicaragua in 1994 (UNDP 2000). Sexual violence and rape are not solely directed at women, however. Men are also vulnerable to sexual assault, at home, in the street, during war, and in prison or police custody.

Children are vulnerable to a range of abuse, both inside and outside the home. In Mexico an estimated 300 children a year die as a result of domestic abuse. In Peru 70 percent of sexual assaults on children occur in the home by a relative or someone known to the victim and his or her family (U.S. Department of State 2002). In Honduras many urban street children have been sexually molested, and about 40 percent regularly engage in prostitution. This is reflected in the incidence of HIV/AIDS: 30 percent of street children in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, Honduras, are reported to be HIV-positive. Forty-seven percent of girls between 10 and 18 in nine Caribbean countries and 40 percent of 16- to 17-year-olds in Lima reported that their first sexual intercourse was forced (U.S. Department of State 2001).

The Causal Roots of Urban Violence in Latin America

The complex causes of violence imply that holistic approaches, rather than those focusing on a specific type of violence, are necessary. One of the most popular, the so-called "ecological model," identifies violence at the structural, institutional, interpersonal, and individual levels and demonstrates that no

single cause determines or explains violence (Bronfenbrenner 1977; WHO 2002).[6] Another important distinction can be made between factors that cause violence and those that shape and facilitate it.[7] The discussion of causes of violence presented here is organized around economic, social, and political factors.

Economic Factors Related to Poverty: Inequality and Exclusion

The common stereotype is that poverty is the primary cause of violence. But the evidence clearly shows that in Latin America, inequality and exclusion, associated with the unequal distribution of economic, political, and social resources in urban contexts across the region, are more important (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 1998, 2002; Londoño and Guerrero 1999; Bourguignon 2001). At the same time, in situations of widespread and severe inequality, the daily living conditions of the urban poor can heighten the potential for the emergence of conflict, crime, or violence (Vanderschueren 1996).

Links between inequality and violence relate not only to income disparities but also to unequal access to employment, education, health, and basic physical infrastructure. In addition, lack of or inadequate state security protection, policing, and judicial systems disproportionately affect the poor, who are unable to pay for their own services and are therefore more susceptible to the impunity, corruption, inefficiency, and even brutality associated with such institutions.

Globalization has been identified as a causal factor underlying the increasing prevalence of urban youth exclusion and the associated growth of gangs. Increasing social fragmentation is countered by the development of an alternative societal membership, in which the violence of gangs becomes a way to gain an acknowledged identity (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002). Precarious living conditions, excessive working hours of parents, the increased material and emotional responsibility of women, severe overcrowding, and the lack of recreational space all weaken the socialization function of the family (FLACSO n.d.; Kramer 2000). If the family cannot cover its basic necessities, it cannot carry out a protective and developmental function for its members (De Orrellana 1997). An oft-cited reason for joining gangs is to find what is not available at home (AVANCSO 1996; Smutt and Miranda 1998).

In Central America the exponential growth of youth gangs is also attributed to the deportation of young Salvadorans from the United States, with deported gang members from Los Angeles "bringing gang wars from the ghettos of Los Angeles to the streets of El Salvador" (De Cesare

1997, p. 38).[8] Migration within Central America has contributed to the regional dissemination of gang culture.

Political Factors Linked to the Legacy of Regional Conflict and Authoritarian Regimes

Recent Latin American political history has affected current patterns of violence, with implications for the urban poor. Political factors include the legacy of decades of protracted internal civil conflict in Central American countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala (and the continuing civil conflict in Colombia), as well as the heritage of brutality associated with totalitarian or authoritarian regimes in countries such as Argentina and Brazil. In both contexts, democratic governments have found it difficult to fight the culture of institutionalized and arbitrary violence (Kruijt and Koonings 1999). Few newly democratic states in Latin America have successfully reformed the police and judiciary (Pereira 2001). As a consequence, state security and judicial apparatuses are widely perceived as repressive, with police officers and other state actors viewed as complicit in organized crime, particularly drug trafficking and prostitution (Adorno 1997). Corruption makes attempts to reduce violence even more challenging and further reduces public confidence in state institutions.

A second historical legacy is the role that prolonged state conflict has played in the "normalization of violence," creating norms, values, and attitudes that reinforce or stimulate the use of violence to resolve conflicts (Kruijt and Koonings 1999). This is perpetuated in democratic contexts when state institutions are unable to maintain social order or uphold justice without recourse to violence as a legitimate means of exerting authority. For example, the judicial void left by institutional failure is a causal factor underlying the rise of violent informal institutions, such as vigilante and self-defense groups. A consequence of armed conflict has been the proliferation of firearms, contributing to the "mass production and consumption" of violence (Kruijt and Koonings 1999, p. 15). In El Salvador, for example, 1.5 million weapons are now believed to be in private hands, only a third of which are legally registered; in Guatemala some 2 million arms are estimated to be in the hands of 36 percent of the civilian population (World Vision 2002; Arriagada and Godoy 1999).

Urban violence has also intensified and changed in political contexts markedly different from those described above. Jamaica, for instance, has relatively low levels of inequality and a virtually homogenous ethnic population, and it has been democratic for many decades since independence. On closer inspection, however, Jamaica is neither cohesive nor democratic,

with a political system based on violence-supporting social and political divisions.

Social Factors, Including Media Sensationalization of Violence, the Availability of Firearms, and the Consumption of Drugs and Alcohol

The Latin American media are partly to blame for creating an atmosphere of fear. Reporting on youth violence and youth gangs is often excessive. In Honduras, for instance, less than 5 percent of crime is committed by youths under the age of 18, yet media representation of this phenomenon is so great that it has created a perception that youths are responsible for a majority of crimes (Arriagada and Godoy 1999). The media have shaped perceptions of insecurity, leading to increases in the number of people who carry guns, increased support for the death penalty, illegal or violent police behavior, and support of the right to kill (Briceño-León 1999). In Chile the media have been noted as being partially responsible for the increase in perceptions of insecurity since the advent of democracy in the early 1990s, before which violence went unreported.[9]

Not all violence attracts equal press coverage. Violence in poor urban neighborhoods is often reported with aggregate figures and is thus depersonalized. In contrast, violence in middle-income areas is considered more headline worthy. It triggers long articles about individual events and is thus personalized. In this way the media construct some victims as more important than others (López Regonesi 2000).

Both drugs and alcohol play roles as risk factors and triggers rather than causes of urban violence, but they differ in their effects. While drug use is associated more with economic violence, alcohol consumption is related more to social violence, particularly gender-based domestic violence. In Nicaragua, for example, 54 percent of abused women indicate that their husbands were usually intoxicated during violence, and nearly one-third cited alcoholism as the major cause of violence (Ellsberg 1997).

The Costs and Consequences of Urban Violence

Monetary cost data provide the basis for comparing the costs of violence and other social ills and for analyzing the cost-benefit implications of different policy options (Macmillan 2000). But violence has a dramatic impact on poor people's well-being in terms of both livelihood security and the functioning of local social institutions, which these data do not capture. Indeed, it has been argued that the tendency to rely on data on

the costs of violence has led to the neglect of the very factors that seem to be the principal consequences of violence, namely insecurity, fear, terror, and a deteriorating quality of life (Rubio 1998). Thus both macro-level costs as well as micro-level impacts of urban violence on various aspects of well-being need to be addressed.

Macro-level costs include both the direct and indirect costs of violence. The greatest advances have been made in measuring the direct economic costs of violence, the associated losses due to deaths and disabilities, and the income transfers from victims of property crime to the perpetrators, calculated as percentages of GNP or GDP (box 4.2). Constraints include the lack of access to information on violence-related expenditure assessments by the police, the judiciary, the penal system, and the armed forces (Arriagada and Godoy 2000). A further limitation is the difficulty of separating the costs of crime in general from those incurred by violent crime. Thus regional cost comparisons are difficult to make, especially at the urban level, where the data are even more limited. In addition, many of the components of indirect costs, both for individual victims and society as a whole, are intangible. Rubio (1998) argues that global measures and international comparisons of the costs of violence are of limited use, given the heterogeneous magnitude and composition of the phenomenon. Consequently, a capital assets framework that analyzes the multiple outcomes of violence in terms of their direct and indirect effects on physical, financial, human, social, and natural capital (see Chambers and Conway 1992; Carney 1998; Moser and Norton 2001) complements analysis of the quantitative data. Of particular concern are financial, human, and social capital.

Box 4.2 The Inter-American Development Bank's Approaches to Measuring the Costs of Violence

The Inter-American Development Bank includes four elements in its estimates of the costs of violence:

- Direct costs: Health system, police, justice system, housing, and social services.
- Indirect costs: Higher morbidity and mortality due to homicides, suicides, abuse of alcohol and drugs, and depressive disorders.
- Economic multiplier effects: Macroeconomic impacts and impacts on the labor market and intergenerational productivity.
- Social multiplier effects: Impact on interpersonal relations and the quality of life.

Source: IDB 2000b.

Violence and the Erosion of Financial Capital

The direct financial costs of violence include increased government expenditure on the police, judicial, and health care systems. Indirect macro-level costs include decreases in foreign and domestic investment and reductions in tourism. Violence in Latin America cost the region an estimated 14.2 percent of GDP, with the highest costs in the form of intangible losses (table 4.2).

There are significant national variations in the financial burden of violence, in terms of both the level and nature of costs. In Colombia the cost of violence is equivalent to almost 25 percent of the GDP. In Peru the figure is just over 5 percent (figure 4.1). Intracountry differences are also significant, often revealing an urban bias. The costs of violence in Caracas alone, for example, accounted for 3 percent of GDP in Venezuela (IESA/FLACSO 1999).

Security costs are high and borne disproportionately by individuals. This effective privatization of security not only delegitimizes the state as an institution of security and control, it also severely affects those unable to pay for their own security (Arriagada and Godoy 1999; Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002). In Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, the costs incurred by citizens protecting themselves from crime are estimated to amount to $3,696 per household per lifetime in fixed costs (World Bank 2002). In Caracas the most significant cost of violence is private security (IESA/FLACSO 1999). Virtually all vehicle owners have security devices in their vehicles, 73 percent of the population has private security in their

Table 4.2 Violence imposes significant costs on Latin America
(percent of GDP)

Type of cost	*Percent of GDP*	
Health losses	1.9	
Medical attention		0.2
Healthy years lost		1.7
Material losses	3.0	
Public security		1.1
Private security		1.4
Justice		0.5
Intangible losses	7.1	
Deterioration in investment productivity		1.8
Deterioration in consumption and work		5.3
Income transfers	2.1	
Total	14.2	

Source: Londoño and Guerrero 1999.

Figure 4.1 The cost of violence varies significantly across countries but is high throughout Latin America



	El Salvador	Colombia	Mexico	Venezuela	Brazil	Peru
direct	9.2	11.4	4.9	6.9	3.3	2.9
indirect	11.7	8.9	4.6	4.6	5.6	2.6
transfer	4	4.4	4.8	0.3	1.6	0.6
total	24.9	24.7	12.3	11.8	10.5	5.1

Source: Adapted from Londoño and Guerrero 1999.

homes, and 39 percent have contributed money or time to community initiatives to reduce crime (IESA/FLACSO 1999).

Health costs associated with violence account for 0.3 percent of GDP in Venezuela, 1.3 percent in Mexico, 1.5 percent in Peru, 1.9 percent in Brazil, 4.3 percent in El Salvador, and 5.0 percent in Colombia (Buvinić, Morrison and Shifter 1999). PAHO estimates that 30 percent of hospital admissions in the region are the result of violence (Briceño-León 1999). In El Salvador, the treatment of victims of violence accounts for 21 percent of the national hospital budget and 12 percent of the budget of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Services (IUDOP 1998).

The violence-related costs firms must incur inhibit domestic and international investment. Firms in Guatemala suffer average losses of about $5,500 a year due to crime (Moser and Winton 2002). Violence also affects access to the local labor supply, particularly the female labor force. Fear of violence also depresses sales and restricts output by limiting working hours when shift patterns are disrupted because staff can travel only at certain times due to fear of violence (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002). In Colombia, for example, 31 percent of respondents avoided nightshifts because of fear of violence (Rubio 1998; IESA/FLACSO 1999).

Tourism is severely affected by violence. For example, it was estimated that a decline in youth crime by 1 percentage point would increase the number of annual tourists by more than 45,000 in Jamaica and by 36,000

in the Bahamas, equivalent to a combined increase in revenue of more than $70 million (World Bank 2002).

Violence and the Erosion of Human Capital

The costs of violence in terms of human capital can be measured in terms of the loss in disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) resulting from violence (box 4.3). Violence reduces life expectancy significantly, since the young are most at risk from many types of violence. Almost 70 percent of homicide victims in Caracas, for example, are between 15 and 30 (Sanjuán 1998).

Violence also inhibits human capital formation by discouraging some individuals from investing in education, encouraging them instead to develop criminal skills. Violence also discourages some people from studying at night (Buvinić, Morrison, and Shifter 1999). Domestic violence has implications not just for the victims but also for future generations, since violence in the home reduces performance at school and therefore future productivity. Women who suffer domestic violence are less productive in the workplace and tend to earn less than women who do not suffer domestic abuse (Buvinić, Morrison, and Shifter 1999). Thus violence against women is not a "private problem but unquestionably a public problem

Box 4.3 The Health Costs of Violence in Latin American Cities

Violence in Latin American cities is having a devastating effect on health and life expectancy:

- In 1995 violent death resulted in the loss of 60,792 DALYs in Peru, 163,136 in Rio de Janeiro, and a staggering 178,000 in El Salvador (Buvinić, Morrison, and Shifter 1999).
- In Rio de Janeiro violence accounted for 19 percent of all DALYs lost, almost twice the 10.3 percent of DALYs lost to cancer (Briceño-León 1999).
- Violence caused the loss of 68,000 DALYs in Mexico City in 1995, 79 percent the result of homicide (Fundación Mexicana para la Salud/Centro de Economía y Salud 1998).
- Violence against women was the third most common source of lost DALYs in Mexico City, after diabetes and complications from childbirth (Buvinić, Morrison, and Shifter 1999).
- In Managua, Nicaragua, abused women use health services (surgery, hospitalization, and visits due to illness) about twice as frequently as nonabused women (Morrison and Orlando 1999).

because the whole of society pays monetarily, as well as nonmonetarily" (Yodanis, Godenzi, and Stanko 2000, p. 273).

Violence and the Erosion of Social Capital

As Rubio (1998) has argued, to see the outcomes of violence, particularly violent deaths, solely in terms of economic costs is to miss the point: there are serious social and cultural consequences when a death is intentional rather than accidental. The social costs of violence include fear and the associated restrictions on community life (Sanjuán 1998). In reducing social contact between members of the community and increasing mistrust, violence erodes social capital (Moser and Holland 1997; Moser and McIlwaine 2003). In Cali, for example, 43 percent of survey respondents reported greatly limiting their recreational activities due to fear of violence (PAHO n.d.); in Caracas the figure was 72 percent (IESA/FLACSO 1999). Almost one in five respondents in a survey of 10 state capitals in Brazil reported that violence had a "very intense" impact on family life, with withdrawal from community life associated with areas most affected by violence (Cardia 1999). Overall, a large proportion of the urban poor in Latin America live with unprecedented levels of violence and with the associated range of consequences, all of which erode their well-being.

Innovative Interventions

Increased concern with violence across the region has meant that violence prevention and reduction is now a growth industry. Given the wide range of direct and indirect interventions, this section can provide only a brief overview of current policy approaches to violence reduction and highlight some of the more relevant interventions.

The main policy approaches and their associated urban-focused interventions can be divided into two types: sector-specific approaches and cross-sectoral approaches (table 4.3). Sector-specific approaches are dominated by the criminal justice approach, which seeks to control and treat violence, and the public health (epidemiological) approach, which aims to prevent violence.

Newer approaches, such as conflict transformation and human rights, reflect increasing concern with political and institutional violence. Recent recognition of the importance of more integrated, holistic approaches has opened the door for cross-sectoral approaches, such as citizen security, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), and urban renewal. Still being developed are community-based approaches to rebuild trust and social capital. Such policies are essentially ideal types. Policymakers

Table 4.3 A variety of approaches and interventions are used to reduce urban violence

Policy approach	*Objective*	*Types of violence*	*Innovative urban-focused interventions*
Sector-specific approaches			
Criminal justice	Deter and control violence through higher arrest and conviction rates and more severe punishment	• Crime • Robbery • Corruption • Delinquency • Family violence	• Judicial reform • Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms • Police reform • Accessible justice systems • Mobile courts • Alternative sentencing • Community policing • All-women police stations
Public health	Prevent violence by reducing risk factors	• Youth violence	• Epidemiological and geographical mapping of crime and violence • Youth policies/social protection • Education reform • Entrepreneurship • Vocational skills training • Cultural and recreational activities • Promotion of behavioral change
Conflict transformation/human rights	Achieve nonviolent resolution of conflict through negotiation and legal enforcement of human	• Political violence • Institutional violence • Human rights abuses • Arbitrary detention	• Traditional systems of justice • Government human rights advocates or ombudsmen • Civil society advocacy NGOs

(table continues on the following page)

Table 4.3 (continued)

Policy approach	*Objective*	*Types of violence*	*Innovative urban-focused interventions*
Sector-specific approaches			
	rights by states and other social actors		
Cross-sectoral approaches			
Crime prevention through environmental design/urban renewal	Reduce violence opportunities by focusing on settings of crime rather than perpetrators	• Economic violence • Social violence	• Municipal-level programs
Citizen/ public/ community security	Prevent or reduce violence through cross-sectoral measures	• Economic violence • Social violence	• National level programs • Municipal level programs
Community-driven development/ social capital	"Rebuild" social capital, trust, and cohesion in informal and formal social institutions	• Youth gangs and *maras* • Domestic violence	• Community-based solutions • Crisis services for victims • Ongoing support and prevention • Communication campaigns • School programs • Programs for perpetrators

Sources: Adapted and updated from Moser and others 2000; Moser and Winton 2002.

have shifted from sector-specific menu-like checklist interventions toward more integrated approaches that combine established policies with more innovative ones.

There are no magic bullets or one-off solutions to reducing violence, although some appear more promising than others. Unfortunately, little

rigorous evaluation of violence reduction interventions over time has been conducted, this review of sector-specific and cross-sectoral approaches is primarily descriptive.[10] Where sufficient evidence is available, prescriptive recommendations are provided.

Sector-Level Interventions with Strong Urban Focus

The Criminal Justice Approach

Criminal justice is the most established approach to urban violence reduction. It focuses on deterring and controlling violence through higher rates of arrest and conviction and harsher punishment. The approach, which involves a combination of judicial, police, and penal reform, is particularly popular with politicians seeking "quick-fix" solutions to the problem of violence.

Judicial reform is a crucial institution-level intervention given the limited access to justice in many Latin American countries and the lack of transparency, predictability, or independence of the judiciary and of alternative resolution mechanisms. Judicial reform is particularly significant for the urban poor, who lack the means to secure their own protection or hire legal counsel, routinely face unequal access to justice, distrust the justice system, and lack information on alternative channels through which to contest matters of rights and justice (Vanderschueren and Oviedo 1995). Reform measures that bring justice into local communities are far more effective than those that reform the overall system. At the urban level, therefore, justice projects in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela have increasingly focused on access to justice in community-focused interventions that include alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, reduction of court costs, legal aid, the creation of small claims courts, and attention to gender issues (Dakolias 1996).

Police reform is another important institutional issue given the widespread lack of trust in the police in poor urban communities, which is closely linked to corruption and human rights abuses. In postconflict settings police demilitarization has been a crucial first step in allowing elected officials to exercise political power. It is essential to the democratic delivery of protection, order, and justice. Local-level interventions are considered particularly effective. One, community policing, is increasingly popular. Its philosophy is to broaden the role of police from maintaining order and preventing criminality to involving the community in the design and implementation of strategies to reduce and prevent violence. A growing number of countries, including Brazil, Colombia, and many countries in Central America, have implemented programs based

Box 4.4 Community Policing in Hatillo, Costa Rica

In 1996 a community policing experiment was initiated in Hatillo, Costa Rica, an area with a high level of insecurity. Its objective was to identify and resolve problems of delinquency and public safety, to reduce the public's feeling of insecurity, to enhance the public's perception of the police, and to incorporate the community in action plans targeting public safety. One hundred and twenty police officers received training in legal and interpersonal skills, and police units were installed to decentralize the police force. New forms of patrols—notably foot and motorcycle patrols—were introduced to patrol Hatillo's narrow streets. Special programs were developed on intrafamily violence, youth delinquency, alternative forms of conflict resolution, and drug prevention. A Monitoring and Communitarian Security Council was established as a permanent consultation body for the planning and execution of police actions.

One year after implementation, the program had achieved the following outcomes:

- The city's biggest problem, assaults, decreased.
- The percentage of the population that felt insecure decreased from 36 percent to 19 percent.
- The proportion of the population that did not trust the police decreased from 49 percent to 29 percent.
- Rates of delinquency and armed and unarmed robbery decreased very little, and rates of burglaries and motor vehicle theft actually increased slightly.

Source: Chinchilla 1999.

on these principles. Costa Rica has adopted a particularly innovative approach (box 4.4).

A comparison of four community policing programs in urban areas in Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala (sponsored by the Military Police in Brazil, the National Police in Colombia, and the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights in Guatemala) reveals that the primary components were institutional change, training strategies for police personnel, community participation, and coordination with other public agencies (Frühling n.d.).

Community policing also includes a growing number of women's police stations. These were pioneered in the mid-1980s in São Paulo, Brazil, as a means of responding to intrafamily and sexual violence. Notable for their primarily female staff trained in handling women victims of violence, Brazil's women's police stations provide services such as counseling and conflict mediation, and they encourage women to file complaints.

The criminal justice approach has its limitations. It focuses on addressing the problem after a crime or violent act has been committed. It usually involves "toughening up" the legal and justice system, increasing policing resources and capacities, and introducing harsher penalties in

an effort to deter and repress crime and violence. In this approach, crime and violence are seen as the responsibility of the police and the courts.

Most countries battling high levels of crime and violence find that the criminal justice approach is not sufficient and usually fails to adequately deal with crime and violence. This can result in a loss of confidence in the criminal justice system. In addition, high-profile "*mano dura*" approaches, such as those currently in place in El Salvador and Honduras, have raised human and civil rights concerns.

The Public Health Approach

The public health approach to urban violence focuses primarily on youth violence from a prevention and risk-reduction perspective. Its major contribution has been to bring epidemiological analysis—meaning the "mapping" of crime and violence, and the identification of risk factors—to the policy debate. Much of the work on the control of alcohol and firearms (risk factors) is a result of the public health approach, pioneered in the region in Cali, Medellín, and Bogotá, Colombia. The implementation of social preventative youth policies is undertaken mostly through local government and community-level NGOs. Interventions include training and skills development, particularly in vocational skills; sports and sporting facilities; and recreational, artistic, and cultural activities to engage youth and promote positive behavior. Organizations such as Casa Alianza, an NGO working in Central America, provide street children shelter, drug counseling, and vocational training while using a "life plan" approach to rehabilitation. That approach sets attainable goals to foster self-respect and hope, qualities often lacking in children who have experienced prolonged violence on the streets.

The Human Rights and Conflict Transformation Approaches

The human rights and conflict transformation approaches include a broad range of strategies for peacefully resolving conflicts. In Latin America the approach has focused mainly on political violence in Central America, with top-down legal or military enforcement reinforced by negotiation among conflicting parties and space for popular participation. These approaches are not specifically urban but can be applied successfully in urban settings.

A human rights–based approach to reducing political violence focuses on the state's role in protecting citizens' rights to be free from victimization and the threat of violence. Such interventions involve collaboration between civil society and local advocacy NGOs. One effective effort is the Peruvian "In the Name of the Innocents" campaign, run during the 1990s by Peruvian human rights NGOs in response to the country's draconian

antiterrorism legislation (Yamin 1999). Examples from Brazil include the NGOs Viva Rio and Sou da Paz (São Paulo), which have campaigned against police brutality and "social cleansing."

Cross-Sectoral Urban Interventions

Cross-sectoral interventions have received growing attention in the past decade. Three interventions that are of particular importance in the cities of Latin America are examined here.

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

A key cross-sectoral approach to urban violence reduction is Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED). The fundamental concept is that the physical environment affects criminal behavior and can be changed in a way that will reduce the incidence and fear of crime (Cooke 2003). Focusing on the settings of crime rather than the perpetrators, the approach is concerned not only with the criminal justice system but also with private and public organizations and agencies, such as schools, hospitals, transport systems, shops, telephone companies, public parks, and entertainment facilities (Clarke n.d.). CPTED techniques have been particularly popular in North American and European cities, where they have achieved some success. Recently they have also been adapted to African and Latin American contexts (see, for example, the work piloted in Chile by Rau and others 2003). The World Bank is also starting to integrate CPTED principles into its urban operations in Brazil and Honduras.

CPTED provides practical recommendations on how to plan, design, and manage the physical environment to reduce urban crime. Planning and design measures can help enhance feelings of safety in areas where people feel vulnerable, through a comprehensive framework of action for planners, urban designers, and architects:

- *Planning:* Dealing with vacant land, encouraging 24-hour land use, promoting safe pedestrian infrastructure, ensuring equitable provision of facilities, and sustaining urban renewal.
- *Design*: Designing appropriate lighting, landscaping, and signage in each of the following areas: soft open spaces (vacant land, parks); movement networks (intersections, taxi ranks, train stations); hard open spaces (pedestrian subways, open parking lots, informal trading); public facilities (communal areas, emergency contact points); and site layout and building design (facades, alleys, garages, toilets, shopping centers).

- *Management:* Establishing institutional arrangements to ensure effective management of the strategy, the support structures and vehicles for implementation, and the environment to ensure ongoing effectiveness (Kruger, Landman, and Liebermann 2001; Rau and others 2003).

South Africa has adopted a modified CPTED framework (table 4.4). Responding to the extreme levels of violence in the Cape Town township of Khayelitsha, the German Bank for Reconstruction and Development (KfW) together with the city of Cape Town designed an innovative "Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading" project. The project uses urban renewal as the entry point to address violence through urban renewal strategies for better environmental arrangements to reduce opportunities for violence, criminal justice measures to discourage potential violators, and public health and conflict resolution interventions to support victims of violence. The range of solutions includes offender deterrence, victim support, and urban renewal strategies (table 4.5). One of the advantages of spatial solutions is that physical infrastructure initiatives are relatively straightforward to implement and can increase perceptions of safety and well-being.

Despite success stories, the CPTED approach has its limitations, since it focuses only on reducing criminal opportunities and may have a limited impact on the level of crime if carried out in isolation (Aurora and others 1999; Kruger, Landman, and Liebermann 2001). To address this concern, "second-generation CPTED" stresses the need to implement the approach as part of a coordinated and participatory crime-prevention strategy, including effective policing and social prevention.

CITIZEN, PUBLIC, AND COMMUNITY SECURITY

Another cross-sectoral approach is citizen, public, or community security (the terms are used interchangeably in different projects and contexts), developed at both the national and municipal level. Since the late 1990s, the Inter-American Development Bank has taken the lead in Latin America and the Caribbean in developing an extensive lending portfolio of national programs to promote "peace and citizen security/coexistence." The underlying policy approach links public health (violence prevention) and criminal justice (violence control). Projects in Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, and Jamaica share similar objectives (table 4A.5). Although none of the projects frames its analyses in terms of the importance of urban violence per se, each of the projects targets urban areas.

The Inter-American Development Bank's approach is a blueprint approach, with similar project components across countries. These include

Table 4.4 The Khayelitsha Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading Project includes many components

Location	*Types of violence and manifestations*	*Spatial and nonspatial violence prevention or reduction interventions*
Shebeens (bars)	• Assault • Murder • Rape • Drug- and alcohol-related violence • Murder; domestic and child abuse	• Relocate shebeens to sites where social and police control is more efficient. • Provide alternative opportunities for socializing where alcohol is controlled. • Establish business code of conduct by shebeen owners association.
Domestic spaces	• Assault • Rape • Child abuse • Emotional abuse	• Provide more houses of refuge and counseling facilities. • Equip police stations with trauma facilities and female officers. • Establish facilities for conflict resolution. • Train police in handling domestic violence cases. • Launch awareness-raising campaigns on domestic rights.
Open public space Open fields Narrow lanes Empty stalls	• Rape • Robbery • Assault • Murder	• Improve street lighting and visibility. • Expand and increase functionality of the telephone system. • Establish rape-relief centers and offer self-defense training. • Create safe walkways.

Table 4.4 (continued)

Location	*Types of violence and manifestations*	*Spatial and nonspatial violence prevention or reduction interventions*
		• Lock vegetable stalls at night. • Operate a 24-hour-a-day public transportation system in the neighborhood. • Increase the visibility of police patrols and neighborhood watches.
Banks and automatic teller machines (ATMs)	• Robbery along routes to and from banks and ATMs	• Increase access to banking and safe deposit places. • Increase the visibility of police patrols and neighborhood watches. • Improve income generation opportunities.
Informal housing	• Burglary in unsecured homes	• Improve income generation opportunities. • Expand and increase visibility of police patrols and neighborhood watches.
Sanitary facilities	• Rape on narrow paths to and from outside sanitary facilities	• Install sewers and phase out outside toilets. • Provide smaller lids for refuse containers so that bodies cannot be dumped. • Supervise communal sanitary facilities.

(table continues on the following page)

Table 4.4 (continued)

Location	*Types of violence and manifestations*	*Spatial and nonspatial violence prevention or reduction interventions*
Schools	• Theft • Vandalism and gangsterism • Physical violence • Possession of drugs and weapons • Gang rape	• Declare schools gun-free zones. • Protect schools against theft and keep out guns by installing better fencing, metal detectors, and guard dogs. • Use guarded schools as safe off-street playgrounds after hours.
Roads and transportation	• Deaths and injuries related to taxi violence • Robbery • Assault • Sexual harassment and assault by drivers	• Declare stations gun-free zones; install metal detectors and lockers. • Bring jobs and services closer to residents to reduce transportation needs. • Place police on trains. • Provide conflict management and development programs to reduce taxi violence by drivers.

Source: Adapted from KfW and City of Cape Town 2002.

creation of information systems, strengthening of institutions, prevention of juvenile violence, development of community-police relations programs, and establishment of social awareness and rehabilitation programs.[11] Budget allocations vary across countries. In all countries the greatest proportion (38–52 percent) is spent on community and other actions to prevent juvenile violence and delinquency, and 23–31 percent goes to institutional strengthening (table 4.5). Community police programs and strengthening the criminal justice system receive about 30 percent of the budget in Colombia but only 4 percent in Honduras. The size of the project loans suggests that these countries are seriously investing in

Table 4.5 Budget allocations in violence reduction projects funded by the Inter-American Development Bank vary

	Colombia		*El Salvador*		*Honduras*		*Jamaica*	
Component	*Millions of dollars*	*Percent*	*Millions of dollars*	*Percent*	*Millions of dollars*	*Percent*	*Millions of dollars*	*Percent*
Institutional strengthening	27.9	29	8.4	24	6.8	31	5.2	26
Community and other actions to prevent juvenile violence and delinquency	19.7	20	13.8	39	11.4	51	7.6	38
Social awareness and communication	8.8	9	4.1	11	0.5	2	0.6	3
Community policing and criminal justice	28.5	30	3.3	9	0.9	4	2.8	14
Total	95.6	100	35.4	100	22.2	100	20	100

Source: Authors' calculations based on project documents (IDB 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003.)

Note: Totals may not add up to 100 percent because of rounding errors. Differences in the ways in which countries assign activities across project components make cross-project comparison difficult. Colombia, the earliest project, divides all activities between national and municipal levels rather than by component types. The other three projects divide activities by component type. Due to these mixed categories of component activities, the data have been recategorized to enable useful comparison across projects.

violence reduction. Whether the outcomes will be commensurate with the investment made remains to be seen.

Citizen security projects are also being developed at the municipal level. Key players include local government leaders, law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, human and social services agencies, civil society, business owners, schools, and neighborhood associations.

Four main elements form the basis of the municipal-authority approach to citizen security (Shaw 2000; CSIR 2000):

- *Diagnosis*: Identifying the crime problems and key local partners involved in crime prevention in a community and analyzing the primary challenges and risk factors related to crime.
- *Action plan*: Developing a local plan of action with short- and long-term goals, selecting the most suitable solutions, and addressing the causes of crime and victimization, not just the symptoms.
- *Management and implementation*: Developing timelines, budgets, and benchmarks.
- *Monitoring and evaluation*: Identifying project objectives and establishing and implementing methods of evaluating project performance.

This approach recognizes that primary responsibility falls not only with the police but with local governments as well, with a crucial role for municipal leaders (Shaw 2000). It considers the strengths and assets of individuals and communities, rather than just their problems. Prevention is cost-effective compared with criminal justice solutions (Shaw 2000).

Like CPTED, the municipal authority approach to crime prevention has been implemented mainly in Europe and North America. Manuals and pilot projects have been developed to assist in planning and implementation in South Africa (CSIR 2000) and Latin America (World Bank 2003), and the approach forms the basis of the strategy of the UN-HABITAT Safer Cities Program (www.unchs.org/programmes/safercities/). Colombia has achieved extraordinary results with a version of the approach (box 4.5). Other successful experiences come from Diadema in the suburbs of São Paulo and the Fica Vivo Program in Belo Horizonte, Brazil (Beato 2005).

There are limits to the extent to which local municipalities can be successful in preventing crime. Rowland (1990) analyzes the challenges faced by a neighborhood policing strategy and a police professionalization strategy in the Mexican municipality of Naucalpan. She finds that the main constraints to public security are its nonexclusive nature, the need for public subsidies to finance it, the potential for spatial externalities, and the lack of municipal capacity. Further constraints in municipal crime prevention exist where drug traffickers control local communities, as they do in Brazil's large cities. In these settings, the limited ability of government

Box 4.5 Reducing Crime and Violence in Bogotá

Championed largely by mayors Mockus and Peñalosa, the city of Bogotá has transformed itself through an approach combining public health, reclaiming of public space, and criminal justice. Crime and violence had steadily increased in the city during the 1980s and early 1990s, with a cumulative negative effect on citizens' sense of security. The increase in insecurity was attributed to a loss of values and traditions of social order, high consumption of alcohol, access to fire arms, impunity, lack of credibility of justice and police institutions, attitudes favoring violent forms of conflict resolution, inappropriate treatment of violence in the media, and the presence of gangs and other armed groups (Castro and Salazar 1998).

Against this context, in 1994 the district administration began implementing a comprehensive program that included improving access to justice; controlling alcohol consumption and traffic accidents; aiding vulnerable groups, such as at-risk youth; and recovering public spaces, such as parks. In terms of public security, efforts were made to strengthen the police force, reduce crime and homicide, and reform the judicial system. Much media attention was given to the *ley zanahoria* (the "carrot law"), which imposed a 1 a.m. closing time for bars and restaurants, and to the rush hour restrictions on private cars.

The results of these interventions have been extraordinary. Homicide rates decreased 50 percent over six years, and the number of deaths from traffic accidents fell from 1,387 in 1995 to 824 in 2000 (Mockus 2001).

institutions to work collaboratively with local community institutions can make the types of municipal crime prevention programs outlined above difficult to implement.

THE COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT/SOCIAL CAPITAL APPROACH

The community-driven development/social capital approach focuses on rebuilding social cohesion in informal and formal institutions. Using bottom-up, participatory processes, this approach aims to create trust by building on the strengths and assets of poor communities affected by violence and to strengthen the organizational capacity of local communities. This approach has been used to fight gang and domestic violence (box 4.6).

The importance of addressing violence interventions that the poor prioritize is a crucial aspect of the community-driven development/social capital approach. Using participatory methodologies, studies of violence in poor urban communities in Colombia, Guatemala, and Jamaica documented community members' interest in identifying solutions, even though they often felt powerless to effect change (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 2001; Moser and Holland 1997). The most striking aspect of these results was

Box 4.6 Preventing Gang Violence in El Salvador: The Homies Unidos Program

Homies Unidos is a nonprofit gang violence prevention and intervention organization in San Salvador. Run by former gang members, its goal is to create a productive and peaceful future for young people who are surrounded by violence. The program is committed to developing creative alternatives to violence through leadership development, self-esteem building, peer counseling, health education programs, and access to vocational training and income opportunities. Members perform rap music as a way of reaching other gang members. The program stresses the need for members to have ownership and a sense of responsibility in the project. It considers dialogue and peaceful mediation the keys to creative conflict resolution.

Magdaleno Rose Avila, founder of the project, comments, "We're the only organization that is run by gangs and by active gang members. We don't pull people out of the gangs… because we think that the gangs are not all negative. If you have a dysfunctional government and a dysfunctional family, the only family [you] have is the gang structure.… So we say that we're going to build a positive role model for gang members… to find a way to reach youth and excite them about a vision that is bigger than the violence they see right now—to make them see beyond the obstacles."

Sources: www.homiesunidos.org; www.changemakers.net.

that more than half of the violence reduction interventions suggested focused on increasing social capital (table 4.6).

Community-driven development/social capital approaches to domestic violence are designed to empower local victims of abuse. Typically, local women's NGOs provide victim crisis services, short-term accommodation facilities for female victims of domestic abuse, counseling, and

Table 4.6 Colombia and Guatemala have tried to reduce violence by increasing capital
(percentage of all solutions)

Intervention	*Colombia*	*Guatemala*	*Total*
Increase social capital	48	58	53
Productive	35	35	35
Perverse	13	23	18
Increase human capital	31	31	31
Increase physical capital	21	11	16

Source: Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 2001.
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.

legal advice and support. Ongoing support and prevention programs for both victims and perpetrators provide longer term community-driven services.

By their very design, community-driven development projects are small and demand driven. They are essential if the needs of communities are to be identified. In the case of victims of domestic violence, a growing number of municipal projects have complemented and scaled up the community-driven development models originally developed by NGOs, providing more extensive support and prevention programs than can be done at the local level (Larraín 1999). Municipalities often offer psychological counseling and therapy services, and they form part of an institutional network to provide referrals to other sectors, such as health, justice, and the police.

Conclusion: Toward an Integrated Framework for Urban Intervention

Urban violence is now widely recognized as a serious development problem, and an increasing number of interventions have been designed to address it. Nevertheless, this is still a new area of inquiry and intervention. As a result, data constraints are severe, as there is very little systematization of information, either analytically or in operational terms.

This chapter shows how social and economic factors affect crime and violence. Too little attention has been paid in the literature to the impact of political and institutional factors at the urban level. The evidence suggests that poor urban communities, particularly in large cities, are caught between the formal institutional violence perpetuated by the state and the arbitrary control of local-level informal institutions. Organized crime, drug dealers, and gangs affect, and sometimes dominate, the governance of local communities. This has critically important implications for the design, implementation, and likely success of local violence reduction interventions.

No adequate assessment (or baseline indicators) has been conducted of the plethora of violence reduction interventions or the institutional capacity of many of the implementing institutions. Despite the vast number and wide range of initiatives addressing youth violence in the region, little data analysis or monitoring of their impact on violence has been conducted (World Bank 2002).

While there is no "silver bullet" to the problem of urban crime and violence, the experiences of different policy approaches suggest that an integrated framework combining each approach's strengths can reduce urban crime and violence. This framework for local action should be

based on a participatory and comprehensive diagnostic. It should include some elements of each of the following types of reform:

- *Judicial/policing reform*: Ensuring that order, fairness, and access to due process are maintained in the day-to-day activities of the community and reducing the public fear of crime.[12]
- *Social prevention*: Establishing targeted multiagency and community-driven development programs that address the causes of and risk factors for crime and violence.
- *Situational prevention*: Adopting measures that reduce opportunities for particular crime and violence problems through urban spatial interventions, such as CPTED and urban renewal.

Preventing and reducing crime and violence require a shared local vision, strong leadership, commitment, and an action plan for the short, medium, and long terms.

One of the most effective entry points for crime and violence prevention is the municipal level. It is the level of government closest to the people, the level at which projects can be designed to target the specific needs of the community. The municipal level is also where the day-to-day delivery of services takes place. These services improve the quality of people's life and help build better living environments. Many of these services are also the basic elements of crime and violence prevention. Effective local government action requires that all municipal services work together rather than in isolation. It requires support from the different sectors in the community, including justice, health, education, the media, the police, social services, the private sector, and NGOs. It also requires support from higher levels of government and links between the national level and state, regional, and provincial governments.

Annex

Table 4A.1 Categories of Violence

Category	*Definition*	*Manifestation*
Political	The commission of violent acts motivated by the desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power.	Guerrilla conflict, paramilitary conflict, political assassinations, armed conflict between political parties
Institutional	The commission of violent acts motivated by the desire, conscious or unconscious, to exercise collective social or political power over other groups and individuals.	Violence perpetrated by state political institutions, such as the army and police; social cleansing by civil vigilante groups; lynching of suspected criminals by community members
Economic	The commission of violent acts motivated by the desire, conscious or unconscious, for economic gain or to obtain or maintain economic power.	Street crime; carjacking; robbery/theft; drug trafficking; kidnapping; assaults, including killing and rape committed during the perpetration of economic crimes
Social	The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for social gain or to obtain or maintain social power.	Interpersonal violence, such as spouse and child abuse; sexual assault of women and children; arguments that get out of control

Source: Adapted from Moser and Clarke 2001; Moser and McIlwaine 2003.

Table 4A.2 Types and Sources of Violence Data

Type of data	*Data sources*	*Examples of information collected*
Mortality	Death certificates; vital statistics registries; reports from medical examiners, coroners, and mortuaries	Characteristics of the deceased; cause, location, time, and manner of death
Morbidity and other health data	Hospital, clinic, and other medical records	Information on disease; injury; physical, mental, and reproductive health
Self-reported	Surveys, special studies, focus groups, media	Attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, cultural practices, victimization and perpetration, exposure to violence in the home or community
Community	Population records, local government records, other institutional records	Population counts and density, levels of income and education, unemployment rates, divorce rates
Crime	Police records, judiciary records, crime laboratories	Type of offense, characteristics of offender, relationship between victim and offender, circumstances of event
Economic	Program, institutional, and agency records; special studies	Expenditures on health, housing, and social services; costs of treating violence-related injuries; use of services
Policy or legislative	Government or legislative records	Laws, institutional policies, and practices

Source: WHO 2002.

Table 4A.3 Incidence of Sexual Abuse of Women in Selected Latin American Cities

Country	*City*	*Year*	*Sample size*	*Percentage of respondents*
Adult women ever sexually assaulted by an intimate partner[a]				
Brazil	São Paulo	2000	941	10.1
	Pernambuco	2000	1,188	14.3
Mexico	Durango	1996	384	42.0
	Guadalajara	1996	650	23.0
Nicaragua	León	1993	360	21.7
Peru	Lima	2000	1,086	22.5
	Cusco	2000	1,534	46.7
Women 16 or older sexually assaulted in the past five years				
Argentina	Buenos Aires	1996	1,000	5.8
Bolivia	La Paz	1996	999	1.4
Brazil	Rio de Janeiro	1996	1,000	8.0
Colombia	Bogotá	1997	1,000	5.0
Costa Rica	San José	1996	587	2.7
Paraguay	Asunción	1996	587	2.7

Source: WHO 2002.

a. Defined as attempted or completed forced sex.

Table 4A.4 Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising

What works	*What doesn't*	*What's promising*
• Frequent home visits by nurses for infants (reduces child abuse) • Weekly home visits by teachers for preschoolers • Family therapy and parent training on delinquent and at-risk preadolescents • Organizational development for innovation in schools • Clarifying and communicating consistent norms in schools • Teaching social competency skills in schools • Training high-risk youth in thinking skills • Vocational training for male ex-offenders • Nuisance abatement action against owners of rental housing used to sell drugs • Extra police patrols in high-crime hotspots • Monitoring high-risk repeat offenders by specialized police units	• Gun buyback programs • Community mobilization against crime in high-crime poverty areas • Police home visits to couples after domestic violence incidents • Individual and peer counseling of students in schools • Drug abuse resistance education • Drug prevention classes focused on fear and other emotional appeals • School-based leisure time enrichment programs • Summer jobs or subsidized work programs for at-risk youth • Short-term, nonresidential training programs for at-risk youth • Diversion from court to job training as a condition of case dismissal • Neighborhood watch programs organized with police	• Proactive drunk driving arrests • Community policing with meetings to set priorities • Police showing greater respect to arrested offenders • Police field interrogations of suspicious persons • Mailing arrest warrants to domestic violence suspects who leave the scene before the police arrive • More police officers in cities • Gang monitoring by community workers and probation and police officers • Community-based mentoring • Community-based after school recreation programs • shelters for battered women • Schools that group students into smaller units • Training at-risk youth in thinking skills • Building school capacity through organizational development

Table 4A.4 (continued)

What works	*What doesn't*	*What's promising*
• Incarcerating high-risk repeat offenders • On-scene arrest of unemployed domestic abusers • Rehabilitation programs with risk-focused treatments for convicted offenders • Therapeutic community treatment programs for drug users in prison	• Arrests of juveniles for minor offenses • Arrests of unemployed suspects for domestic violence • Increased arrests or raids on drug market locations • Storefront police officers • Police newsletters with local crime information • Correctional boot camps using military basic training • Visits by minor juvenile to adult prisons • Shock probation, shock parole, and split sentences • Intensive supervision on parole or probation • Rehabilitation programs using unstructured counseling	• Improved classroom management techniques • Prison-based vocational training for adults • Moving urban public housing residents to suburban homes • Establishment of enterprise zones • Redesigned layout of retail stores • Target hardening • Metal detectors • Street closures, barricades, and rerouting of traffic • Intensive supervision and aftercare of juvenile offenders • Problem solving analysis at each crime location • Fines for criminal acts • Drug courts

Source: Sherman and others 1998.

Table 4A.5 Features of Inter-American Development Bank Projects to Reduce Violence in Four Latin American Countries

Item	*Colombia*	*Jamaica*	*El Salvador*	*Honduras*
Project	Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security Support	Citizen Security and Justice Program	Social Peace Program Support Project	Peace and Citizen Coexistence Project
Disbursement period	4½ years beginning in 1998	4 years beginning in 2001	4½ years beginning in 2002	3–5 years beginning in 2003
Budget	IDB: $57 million Local: $38.6 million Total: $95.6 million	IDB: $16 million Local: $4.0 million Total: $20 million	IDB: $27.9 million Local: $7.5 million Total: $35.4 million	IDB: $20.0 million Local: $2.2 million Total: $22.2 million
Executing agencies	National Development Project Fund, National Planning Dept, Capital District; municipalities	Ministry of National Security and Justice	Ministry of the Interior	Municipality of San Pedro Sulas
Target population	Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín municipalities	Kingston Metropolitan Area	San Salvador and high-population municipalities	Sula Valley municipalities

Objective	Reduce violence and insecurity by strengthening efforts to prevent, counteract, and control criminal acts and violence	Enhance citizen security and justice by reducing violence, strengthening crime management, and improving judicial services	Improve citizen security and reduce rates of juvenile crime and violence	Improve levels of peace, coexistence, and citizen security by preventing violence and strengthening institutions
Components	1. National Subprogram ($34.0) • Create national crime database ($6.0) • Assist Ministry of Justice and develop alternative methods of justice ($2.6) • Conduct research on legal action and justice and gender ($1.5) • Develop national communications strategy ($0.3)	1. Capacity building of the Ministry of National Security and Justice ($4.6) • Strategic planning and project execution ($0.3) • Technical assistance ($4.3) 2. Community action ($7.6) • Violence prevention services ($5.2) • Community action committees ($0.6) • Community-based multipurpose facilities ($1.5)	1. Institutional strengthening ($8.4) • Project coordination and execution ($2.9) • Information technology and interconnectivity ($3.4) • Technical assistance ($0.2) • Monitoring and evaluation ($0.8) 2. Prevention of juvenile violence and delinquency ($19.6)	1. Institutional strengthening ($6.8) • Institutional support to municipalities, police, and public prosecutors • Integrated citizen security information system (SISC) • Monitoring and evolution 2. Social prevention of violence and juvenile delinquency ($11.4)

(table continues on the following page)

Table 4A.5 (continued)

Item	*Colombia*	*Jamaica*	*El Salvador*	*Honduras*
	• Educate police to improve relations with communities ($4.0) • Provide technical assistance to promote exchange of experiences ($2.6) • Extend line of credit ($13.05) • Promote, administer, and monitor project ($1.0) 2. Municipal Subprogram ($61.6) • Crime report stations ($5.2) • Programs to improve access to justice ($14.4) • At-risk youth and rehabilitation ($16.9) • Citizen education ($8.8)	• Improved community-police relations ($0.3) 3. Strengthening the criminal justice system ($2.8) • Assistance and training to Victim Support Program and Boards of Visitors ($0.4) • Assistance and training to police complaints authority and information campaign ($0.2) • Support to a rehabilitation, vocational training, and transformation center for youths ($1.5)	• Social prevention of violence and delinquency in municipalities ($9.6) • Prevention of domestic violence and victim services ($0.5) • Strategic plan for the national police ($3.3) • Promotion of youth employment ($0.9) • National social awareness strategy ($4.1) • Innovative projects from civil society ($1.3) 3. Rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile offenders ($1.6)	• Positive development for vulnerable and at-risk youths • Prevention of violence and delinquency in schools • Youth community center • Job training and youth employment program • At-risk youth assistance • Prevention of domestic violence and victim assistance 3. Community police/crime prevention ($0.9) • Support of community police

• Police/community relations ($4.9) • Citizen watch ($2.8) • Institutional strengthening of government ($1.9)	• Technical assistance and training for courts ($0.7) 4. Social marketing ($0.6) 5. National crime and violence prevention strategy ($0.6) • Study on costs of violence • Technical assistance	• Reintegration of juvenile offenders ($0.2) • Reintegration of young adult offenders ($1.4)	• Support of a regional family protection services division • Support of a system for police oversight and accountability 4. Communication and social awareness ($0.5) • Communication campaign • Media awareness

Source: IDB 1998, 2001, 2002, and 2003.
Note: Figures in parentheses are in millions and do not include costs for financing and contingencies.

Endnotes

1. The WHO (2002) divides violence into three broad categories. *Self-directed violence* is physical harm inflicted by oneself. This category is subdivided into suicidal behavior and self-abuse. *Interpersonal violence* includes injury or harm caused by a relative (domestic violence) or an unrelated person (community violence). *Collective violence* includes harmful acts committed by a group. These acts can be politically, economically, or socially motivated.

2. Conflict can be peacefully resolved through negotiation without recourse to force; it becomes violent when it includes fighting and killing. By definition crime is an act (usually a grave offense) punishable by law; *violent crime* is defined as any act that causes a physical or psychological wound or damage that is against the law (Vanderschueren 1996).

3. This section draws on the work of experts on violence in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as on previous work by the authors (see Moser and others 2000; Moser and Winton 2002; Moser and McIlwaine 2003). Table 4A.1 summarizes some of the common types of violence for each category.

4. For detailed descriptions of the nature of youth gangs, see Moser and McIlwaine (2003) on Colombia and Guatemala, Rodgers (2003) on Colombia and Nicaragua, and Smutt and Miranda (1998) on El Salvador.

5. Reported statistics may not be meaningful, as the majority of kidnappings are believed to go unreported, because of fear of reprisals.

6. First used to explain human development (Bronfenbrenner 1977), the ecological model has been used by violence researchers to elucidate the complex causes of child abuse (Belsky 1980), sexual coercion (Brown 1995), and domestic violence (Heise 1998). The model is a multilevel framework that incorporates both individual-level factors—biophysical, psychological, and social—and external factors that act upon the individual.

7. Briceño-León (1999) identifies social inequality and the breakdown of traditional controls such as the family as factors that generate violence; the absence of mechanisms of conflict resolution as factors that promote violence; and easy access to firearms, alcohol and drug consumption, and media sensationalization as factors that facilitate urban violence (see also Arriagada and Godoy 1999).

8. The two main gangs in Central America, the maras 18 and Salvatrucha, use the same names as the two main Latino gangs in Los Angeles.

9. Reports of corruption and impunity, which did not occur under the previous regime, have also become everyday news.

10. The difficulty of evaluating programs is illustrated by a congressionally mandated evaluation of state and local crime prevention programs funded by the U.S. Department of Justice. A review of more than 500 crime prevention programs meeting certain standards, with special attention to youth violence, found only minimally adequate evidence to establish a provisional list of "what works, what doesn't, and what's promising" (Sherman and others 1998). This list is reproduced in table 4A.4.

11. Honduras has a distinct emphasis on positive development and community facilities for at-risk youth.

12. While the World Bank cannot be directly involved in policing issues, such as police reform, it can recognize the importance of the role of police and the judicial system, work on judicial reform, and encourage crime and violence prevention partnerships that include the police.

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