Concluding Remarks: Strategies for the Emergence of the Democratic Developmental State in the Global South

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This chapter summarizes the strategies that could permit the rise of the democratic developmental state (DDS) in countries of the South. To start with, there has been the confusion among the political leaderships in the South on the choice of adapting either the capitalist or socialist development framework or a mixture of the two in their development strategies in the post-colonial period. A greater concern is the tendency by some scholars to equate the DDS with a capitalist state. This is partly because most of the case studies in the literature are drawn from capitalist states. This is even when the majority of the capitalist states, inclusive of those in the Asian NICs, are faced with democratic deficits. In doing so, the prospect of a socialist state becoming democratic and developmental is foreclosed. Therefore, there is the need to explore the feasibility of the DDS in the South where the development framework is either capitalist or socialist.

Even though there is nothing to suggest in the received literature on the DDS that the countries of the South should adopt either capitalist or socialist development frameworks in their development policies, the choice of the development framework depends, among others, on the ideology of development bequeathed by former colonial powers to the post-colonial state, the kind of political leadership created in the post-colonial period and its orientation to development; adherence to democratic principles, and the prevailing global development ideology. For instance, most states in the global South took either the capitalist or the socialist path to development within the first decade of their political independence. In
some instances, the state even declared a mixture of capitalist and socialist development policies, but demonstrated capitalist accumulation in practice as it was the case of the Nigerian state in the 1960s.

The Indian variant of a mixed economy shows that the state is capitalist to all intents and purposes, though it might lean at times towards socialist policies. In Benin, Matthew Kereku first began with the socialist path to development and even with a strong emphasis on Marxist-Leninist theories, but changed midstream to capitalist development in the late 1970s and 1980s as the state embarked on externally-oriented economic reform programmes. The resurgence of the Left since 2001 in Latin America countries after the termination of the neo-liberal Washington Consensus initiative and the formulation of the radically-biased Buenos Aires Consensus, is quite instructive on the alternative path states in the global South can chart for their development and its implications for the rise of the DDS.

Further, with the introduction of the World Bank/IMF-styled structural adjustment programmes in Africa at the turn of the 1980s, which sought to de-link the state from the real sector of the economy and to replace it with foreign capital, but failed to achieve its objective, the majority of the adjusted economies had the capitalist mode of development foisted on them. Unable to repay the loans borrowed from the Bretton Woods Institutions and the London and Paris Clubs, the reform policies and programmes of the Bank and Fund that the majority of Africa debtor countries embraced in the 1980s sank their economies into deeper crisis with resultant political and social upheavals. By the 1990s, the economies of adjusted Latin American countries like Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Argentina were in severe crises. Yet, they adopted the Washington Consensus, and that further traumatized their economies. By the onset of the year 2000, Venezuela and Argentina terminated the WCI, with other countries following suit. All this is an indication that the state could take the path of either the capitalist or socialist development and yet none of them could single-handedly lead to the rise of a DDS in the South when the democratic credentials are missing. Its feasibility is further compromised when democracy is treated as a separate issue from development as evident in most of the literature on the subject, while it is in fact an inseparable part of development.

The extent to which a state can be characterized as DDS first calls for a contextual understanding of the state. In deconstructing the DDS, therefore, the state means the totality of the classes, institutions, groups and individuals which, acting as a public social force, dominates the society not impartially, but along the narrow group interests that make the state a reality. In practical terms, therefore, the state means the political leadership which is politically formulated along class and institutional interests. This shows that the state can neither be neutral nor impartial in its policies, programmes and projects. In turn, it explains why the state can hardly rise above the narrow interests of its constituents in its approach
to politics and the kind of development – capitalist or socialist – that it promotes. In fact, the DDS can either be capitalist or socialist in orientation and practice. For instance, a political leadership that believes in the exploitation of man by man, private property and unequal distribution of wealth as the basis of economic and production relations, such a leadership is obviously nurturing the rise of the capitalist state, while it quite off the road to equality and social justice.

On the other hand, the socialist state is not only concerned with re-distributing wealth among the people, but it helps to bring together the broad working masses, the patriotically-minded petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia to transform all aspects of life—both material and spiritual—in line with the principles of justice, equality and collectivism. The experience of the socially-based Cuban state and its South-South Cooperation, particularly in the health sector, holds out a great lesson for other countries of South that desire to be on the path to the democratic and developmental state. However, the huge democratic deficits of the Cuban state in terms of its lack of multiparty democratic practices, undemocratic political leadership succession and severe restriction of rights of the people are democratic deficits that should be overcome if the state could be regarded as being on the path of a DDS.

To all appearances, the majority of the states in the South have only charted interim development frameworks. Even then, the strategies are ridden with inherent shortcomings that needed to be resolved. It is only a holistic strategy to development in which democracy becomes the instrument for, and an intricate part of, such development that the political and economic limitations among others can possibly be overcome. Therefore, either capitalist or socialist, the democratic developmental state requires certain irreducible minimum conditions, notably, a political leadership that enjoys reasonable measure of autonomy from the society, but aligns with groups, classes and institutions that will facilitate the delivery of its set development objectives. Other defining characteristics of the DDS include accountability, responsiveness and transparency, democratic governance, people-centred development and effective delivery of public goods. In all this, democratization, as a development strategy is very instrumental for empowering the people in the policy process and in achieving the DDS in the South.

Generally, democratization is concerned with the empowerment of the people to participate effectively in politics and development. It is a very potent instrument for achieving people-centred development, as it enables the people to decide the kind of development that they desire and, to engage in the formulation, implementation and renewal of such a development. In doing so, the people become the agent, means and essence of such a development. Democratization is the antidote to the zero-sum attitude that characterizes politics and political competitions across the South.
Specifically, to democratize the political leadership entails democratizing politics of both the government in power and its political parties, and as well the opposition parties and politics. It involves empowering the people to express their desire for political and economic development. It consists of democratizing the polity by creating the appropriate framework that facilitates broad-based participation in politics inclusive of the opposition. This allows the people to freely choose who governs them, and to give the people the liberty to exercise an oversight function over their representatives in government by making them to account for their actions or inactions on issues that pertain to their well-being and societal development.

Further, there is the need to democratize the opposition politics and parties which in most cases are equally undemocratic in their organization and activities like the parties in power. For the leadership of the opposition parties is not only part of the national political leadership, but its democratization helps to raise the democratic credentials of the state and its performance. In fact, to democratize the opposition is a strategy for raising a critical shadow government expected to play the role of a watch dog on the incumbent regime and in doing so, helps to promote good governance and participatory development. Therefore, the democratization of the opposition promotes healthy political competition between and among political actors and institutions and it helps to sustain democratic political transition across governments and over long periods.

However, the majority of the political leadership in the South resist democratization on the grounds that it whittles down their political power which holds the key to accumulate wealth. This is a huge misconception of democratization as noted. Rather, the political leadership's obsession with a winner-takes-all approach to politics, which makes politics a deadly warfare, accounts for its disdain for democratization. Whether the political elite are both in government and in power, that is, the tiny fraction and faction of the state that has a firm grip on its political power, or whether they are outside of such a powerful political clique within the state structure, but they are in government, or whether such political elites are acting either to actualize their parochial interests, or they are proxies for subterranean political forces they (the political elite) stifle the process of democratization from taking off across the countries of the South.

In spite of the pretensions about the democratization project of the post-colonial states in Nigeria and South Korea, they are threatened by the changes in the political system that liberalize how people gain access to political power and by the changes that seek to democratize how the system legislates, formulates and implements policies.

All this significantly explains why the states can hardly embark on a political reform that seeks first to liberalize the polity, then to democratize political parties and bring about a substantive democratic change in the political leadership of
both countries. Rather, the Nigerian state and its South Korean counterpart, usually reposition their clients to occupy sensitive political positions in order to retain their firm control of political power with which they accomplish their limited social, economic and political interests and those of the institutions that make them a reality.

Notwithstanding the reluctance of the states to enthrone the process of democratization in the South, it is indispensable to the feasibility of the DDS. The political leadership first has to imbibe democratic principles, values and practices, before it can internalize them into the state institutions, government, political parties and public policy among others. Also, democratization opens up the political space, helps to empower the people to actualize their inalienable rights, and permits them to participate in the kind of development-political and economic that they desire, which has to be experiential and sustainable.

There is the need for the developing countries to share experiences in their strategies towards becoming a DDS. In doing so, it should be noted that the experience of the countries with development – politically and economically – have their positive and negative consequences. It is all the more so, because of the diversity of the countries of the South in terms of history, culture, national development strategy and priority and political systems. There is no one development framework that states are under any obligation to follow in their quest for the best form of state nor are the states compelled to replicate the experience of others that have posted relative development indicators. Rather, the differences in the experiences and exposures of the political leaderships and their commitments or indifference to development across the countries of the South should provide a rich menu for them to draw from and situate such experiences in the context of the local condition as they struggle for the attainment of their ideal. I elaborate on this with the feats achieved by countries like India and Cuba, while noting their shortcomings and the lessons to be learnt.

The Indian state has, on account of its historical antecedents, particularly the need to reverse the inherited colonial development policies and programmes, used the instrumentality of the policy of non-alignment to largely leverage the development of the country in the Cold War period. This was at a time when the non-aligned movement (NAM) provided only a platform for most developing countries to take advantage of the superpower rivalries by shopping for foreign aid from both the East and the West and to shield their countries from possible military hostilities during the Cold War years. Compared with India under Nehru, another frontline leader of the NAM, President Tito of Yugoslavia was unable to deploy the non-alignment policy to promote the development of his country.

In particular, the Indian state had, within the framework of the non-alignment policy, created a political environment at both international and domestic levels which was conducive to actualize India’s objectives of rapid and overall economic development consistent with its national ethos, temperament and ingenuity.
Internationally, the non-aligned policy framework facilitated India’s most imaginative contribution to world politics. It was a unique Indian political invention that sought to avoid military alliances in the context of the Cold War, but refused isolation and neutrality. It provided the basis for a positive and beneficial interaction with the international community for internal reconstruction and development, while strategically insulating themselves to the extent they could, from Cold War rivalries and conflicts. This contrasted sharply with Nigeria’s external relations in the period under review, when the non-aligned policy was interpreted essentially as establishing relations with Britain and other countries of the West, but obviously opposed to opening diplomatic missions in the socialist countries of the Eastern European bloc.

Domestically, the non-aligned policy facilitated India’s adoption of a mixed economy approach to its development; an approach that permitted the complementary existence of public and private sectors in the national economy. Heavy industries like iron and steel, and machinery were established in the public sector, because they were expected to facilitate the production of public goods and quicken the country’s industrialization; while the private sector was expected to mobilize private funds for industrialization and help in the creation of an indigenous entrepreneurial class. Conceptually, this contrasted sharply with the situation in Nigeria where the mixed economy arose largely from the nationalist struggles and the political leadership allowed capitalist and socialist frameworks to co-exist on paper, while in practice a socialist development strategy was never really allowed in the country, or when it could have emerged like in the Western region under the premiership of Obafemi Awolowo.

Sharing of development experiences between countries of the South can be counter-productive to the rise of the DDS. For instance, the technical agreement signed by the Nigerian government with the Hindustan Machine Tool Company of India in 1988 to establish the Machine Tools Limited, Oshogbo, Nigeria and to help build and train the technical skills for the company ought to have been a sharing of vital experience and information by both countries on strategies for industrialization. But it turned out to be one of the multi-million Naira scandals in the country in which the Hindustan Machine Tools of India was implicated in inflating the prices of completely knocked-down parts, the non-supply of parts for which payment was effected, non-installation of the lathe machines and non-compliance with the terms of agreement. The officials of the Hindustan Machine Tools of Indian reportedly committed the fraud, but it was with the connivance of Nigerian government officials and politicians.

One of the implications of such a fraudulent act by an Indian company is that it could block the prospect of sharing information and experiences between and among the countries of the South in a globalizing world, while the North continues to undermine the strategies of the Third World countries to industrialize. Even
long after the contract scam, the Nigerian state had, rather than develop the Machine Tools Limited Oshogbo, sold the project to a private company under its privatization programme in which state-owned enterprises were disposed of. Beyond the sharing experiences on development by the Southern countries, coupled with the need to avoid a repeat of the fraud by the Hindustan Machine Tool in Nigeria, it is imperative for the developing countries to create appropriate institutions with a demonstrated commitment to govern the terms of the technical agreement and adapt them to suit their local conditions.

Further, when India first liberalized its economy in the early 1980s and embarked on a more radical economic reform following the economic crisis in 1991 in order to give the market a greater say and role in the national economic management, the role of the state changed but it did not disappear. Even after the Indian state opened up its economy, it still created the conditions that permitted the successful functioning of the market-oriented economy ‘such as the provision of public education, health services and arrangements for social security’. The state micro-managed the national economy and took critical decisions on the inflow of foreign direct investment and other major issues such as labour and industrial relations, removal or rationalization of subsidies, and development of physical infrastructure. Compared to the period of adjustment in Mexico in the 1980s, as the state crumbled, it succumbed to the dictates of the Bretton Woods Institutions, bringing to the fore the menace of drug trafficking barons as a countervailing force to the state, a worsening trend of insecurity and corruption among other governance challenges in the country.

Above all, the Indian state decentralized the national development process both spatially and functionally, created an appropriate policy environment that allowed civil society organizations to flourish, though they were not a substitute for the state, and established micro-finance schemes that led to the emergence of the village or rural bank otherwise known as the Grameen Bank that benefited over 50 million households in India and Bangladesh. The Indian state also formulated regional economic cooperation and integration schemes in South Asia that provided a platform to drive India’s regional economic initiative and facilitate its interaction with transnational corporations. With its breakthrough in the information and communications technologies and software, India became the major revenue base of the business process outsourcing in South Asia.

Without doubt, the aforementioned achievements have put the Indian state on the path of a capitalist developmental state, but on the path of a DDS in its politics and the cultural milieu of its development. There is still the unwillingness on the part of India’s culture not the least, the Asian NICs, to divulge secrets of its relative industrial growth as demonstrated in the lopsided and failed technical agreement between the Hindustan Machine Tool Limited of India and the Machine Tools Limited, Oshogbo, Nigeria.
Further, in 1988, the military regime of Ibrahim Babanginda sent an official delegation to study the strategies of the relatively successful village and rural banking in India. Subsequently, the government established the Peoples’ Bank under the chairmanship of a social critic, Tai Solarin. Perhaps the success of the Grameen Bank of India was because it stemmed from the people and was later encouraged by the state. The expectation of the people was that it would have started from the local and village people and supported by the government but not the situation whereby the state created the Peoples’ Bank, staffed and funded the company like a state-owned enterprise, and the people, most of whom were urbanites, were allowed to source credits from the bank.

From the onset, the Peoples’ Bank might have been conceived as rural banking, but its objective and operation were in line with commercial banking. It might be true that it is not possible to replicate India’s cultural setting in Nigeria but the failure of the Peoples’ Bank stemmed largely from the lack of commitment of the Nigerian state and the private sector to rural banking. They ought to have carefully studied the strategies of the Indian state and adopted relevant aspects of such strategies to suit the Nigerian situation.

Following the collapse of the Peoples’ Bank, the Community Banks were established. They became an enlarged local thrift society revolving loans among the owners of the banks and their family members and friends. The target group – the local people – who the micro-finance scheme was supposed to benefit, were denied funds. The insolvency of the Community banks was a major problem. The current reform in the banking system aimed at saving the banks from bad and unrecoverable debts, insolvency and threat of liquidation are partly indications that the Nigerian state is way off the track of even a developmental state.

Another critical area where developing countries ought to share their experience with development between and among themselves is to adapt the framework of South-South cooperation to their development programmes and external relations. Co-operation between and among the countries of the South has the potential to help mutual assistance with financial resources, technical know-how and natural resources in their quest for development. In fact, the global economy of today requires an increased South-South cooperation aimed at strengthening the weak states. It is all the more so, partly because of the declining interest of the core countries of the North to assist the Southern countries that the aid fatigue the North has induced since the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the inherent incapacities like the lack of democratization, inept political leadership, bad governance and corruption among others, have constrained their development in the South.

Cuba has, within the context of the South-South cooperation, advanced technological capabilities in tropical medicine and has exchanged such expertise with Uganda. In fact, Cuba has assisted Uganda to acquire an outstanding and valuable experience in the control of the HIV/AIDS across the rural and urban
areas of the country. Cuba’s medical Henry Reeve Brigade has been an effective instrument for transmitting such capabilities. Medical cooperation is a major issue in the Cuban civilian cooperation under which Cuban doctors, nurses, and other health personnel were sent to work and train medical and paramedical personnel in countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Cuba also established local versions of its national health care model called the Comprehensive Healthcare Programme in various countries in Latin America. Cuba has used the South-South framework to collaborate in other areas such as education and training, where students from developing countries graduated from Cuban institutions, especially in the Medical Sciences. Cuba’s Operation Miracle facilitated the surgery on ophthalmologic problems free of charge across the developing countries with huge success.

That a socialist state can be on the path of a developmental state is quite evident in Cuba’s medical cooperation with other developing countries. Cuba’s medical policy of providing health for all and at affordable rate compelled the state to commit both human and technical resources to the development of such a vital social service, first within the country, before exporting the medical expertise to other countries socially. That Cuba’s political system is state-controlled does not foreclose the development of social services. It implies that the developmental philosophy of the Cuban state is people-centred, but it needs to redress the democratic shortcomings earlier identified.

One interesting lesson that the Cuban experience with the South-South framework holds out for other developing countries is the need for the political leadership first to identify an aspect of the national development, then to formulate appropriate policy, programme and projects, and finally, to commit resources to such programmes and projects in the hope of carving out a competitive edge in the form of expertise over other actors. Such expertise can then be transmitted to other developing countries to facilitate their development using South-South cooperation among others.

Nigeria’s Technical Aid Corp (TAC) was created by the state in 1988 as an instrument for deploying technocrats in various fields like medicine and engineering to other African countries and settling their bills. The TAC would have achieved similar feats as Cuban medical co-operation, if the states had inclined to developmentalism. From the onset, the key objective of the TAC was to shore up Nigeria as an emergent giant of Africa, instead of situating it within the South-South context of the country’s international relations. The greatest problem of the programme was the obvious acute shortage of well trained medical doctors and personnel and competent engineers in the country. The state wanted to deploy such technocrats to other African countries. The ability of the developing countries to cash in on the South-South framework as a strategy to empower the relative weak states across the South and in the process facilitate the emergence of the DDS largely depends on whether the domestic development policies, programmes and projects of the state are democratized in the first place.
There is the need to construct appropriate institutions and policy instruments with the right arrangements that will nurture indigenous business with which the DDS will embed, as it seeks to actualize its development goals. Of particular importance, is the need to incubate a virile indigenous entrepreneurial class that can participate effectively in the policy process. This is because the existence of a strong local business class is one of the defining characteristics of the DDS.

The absence of a strong local business class that the state can embed with in order to actualize its development objectives is a major challenge that the Malaysian and South African states are still faced with. The challenge arises partly from the social, economic and political features both countries share: heterogeneity in terms of religion, race and ethnic composition. For instance, the minority race and ethnic groups are in charge of the real sector of the economies, while the majority ethnic group dominates the politics and state institutions after independence. In Malaysia, while the economy is dominated by the ethnic Chinese, the state institutions have the indigenous Malays in the majority. The same is true of South Africa, where the economy is dominated by the minority white population while the black population, especially Africans, controls politics and state institutions. In both countries, one major political party with membership drawn largely from the majority ethnic group dominates politics.

As a consequence, there have been increasing inequalities and the identification of race and ethnicity with economic functions. It is in response to these concerns that the Malaysian and South African states have been formulating strategies aimed at promoting an indigenous capitalist class and the reduction of poverty. For instance, the Malaysian state initiated the New Economic Policy (NEP) as an instrument to reduce poverty and restructure and correct the economic imbalances by uplifting the social and economic position of the Bumiputeras into a new domestic business class. The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) was the custodian of the NEP goals, while other agencies like the MIDA, SEDCs and PDC were created to ensure that the targets of the NEP were met. As part of the strategy to empower the Bumiputera entrepreneurs to intervene in the policy process, the Malaysian government organized special training courses, advisory services, provision of zero-interest loans, business premises and reserved contracts for them. Indeed, the implementation of the NEP created a social and political climate that enabled the business community to thrive. In all, the Chinese not only increased their corporate equity, but achieved social peace with the NEP.

However, the Bumiputera business class has been criticized as a rentier class that depended on government patronage. The Bumiputera political and bureaucratic elites inclusive of the emergent business persons used the state as a source of wealth accumulation. State officials awarded contracts to companies in which the burgeoning Bumiputera elites were directors, or to companies of their friends and family members. The majority of the Bumiputera business groups
and persons were involved in speculative rather than productive activities, which had few national economic benefits. In fact, rent seeking activities permeated the political economy of Malaysia, with few national economic benefits. The state became authoritarian, which is the characteristic of the states in the Asian NICs like the South Korean state that barred the parliament from debating and curtailed the press from reporting on the policy and prohibited the civil society groups from engaging it. Creating a local business class does not really mean that the state has to back it at all cost with all its resources. The strategy rather should entail modest competition, entrepreneurship and investment in productive activities. These are critical lessons for the majority of African political leadership and some scholars who are desirous of replicating the Malaysian development strategy in the continent.

South Africa is marked by a racial division of labour, which is one of the legacies of apartheid and that contrasts it with Malaysia’s ethnic division of labour. South Africa has two economies – one poor and mostly black, and one rich and mostly white. State-business relations in South Africa bring to the fore the fragmentation of business along racial lines, namely, the state-black business class, which is financially weak compared with the second and rich group, the state-white business class. The relationship between the two major stakeholders in the country’s economy is weak and business has not been able to speak with one voice. This partly explains why the country’s economy is still dominated by the rich white minority race group to the detriment of the poor majority business group, and the resultant high levels of poverty and inequality since the official termination of the apartheid regime in 1994.

As part of the strategy of overcoming business fragmentation along racial lines, the South African state fostered a non-racial business association, Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) in 2003 and the merger of all chambers of commerce and industry into the Chamber of Commerce and Industry South Africa (CHAMSA) in the same year. However, the federation of the business groups did not translate into a shared developmental agenda between the black and white business groups, nor did it lead to the emergence of a virile local black business class that is capable of intervening in the policy process.

The embeddedness of the South African state with the white business class has been constrained by the pre-apartheid fears of the big business groups about the ANC’s nationalization policy and its wealth re-distribution in favour of the blacks, which marked the post-1994 era. Coupled with the white business opposition to the BEE and Affirmative Action policies of the ANC-led government, which were supported by the incipient black business class, the gulf between the white business and the state widened. The white business group also raised concern over how the state’s policy was disrupting the operation of market forces. All this reinforced the white business’s lack of trust in the South African state.
On account of the weak black business class, the South African state introduced measures for incubating and nurturing it. Some of the strategies included the establishment of the National Empowerment Fund, which provided loans for black business; the further support of the Industrial Development Corporation, and the BEE Programme. The state facilitated these programmes by awarding state tenders to black businesses. The BEE arranged deals in line with government policies that benefited the black people, especially in the privatized state-owned TELKOM, in which shares were sold to them. Other BEE deals in the private sector were in two leading South African banks, NEDBANK and ABSA, which benefited the workers and communities, although their spread was rather limited. This is referred to as a minimalist approach to the BEE.

Critics have characterized the emerging black business class as parasitic individuals, who owed their positions to political connections but not business acumen. The BEE policy did not create entrepreneurs, but political leaders and politically-connected people and bestowed assets on them which they lacked the know-how to manage. The BEE has a narrow policy that focused on share-acquisition without enough attention paid to entrepreneurial development and skills training as a way of creating a sustained and independent black business class. It created a black business group that relied on crony capitalism and self enrichment, which was similar to the Bumiputera businesspeople in Malaysia in the 1970s and 1980s. Again, these limitations of the South African situation present useful lessons for the political leaderships for other Third World countries while rethinking their development strategies along the lines of the DDS.

There is a need for new research areas on the DDS across the developing countries, beyond the scholarly works that currently are projected. There are more issues that could be covered under the broad partnership of APISA, CLASCO and CODESRIA collaborative and joint research on the DDS beyond this work. These issues include regime types, embeddedness, representivity, democratization, good governance, environmental sustainability, comparative development, with premium placed on the sharing of development experiences among Third World countries, pluralism, diversity and civil society groups. Others are South-South cooperation, with the emphasis on the impact of such cooperation on the local condition, the economic cost and the possibility of transfer of expertise. It is also important for research to focus on developing a model of cooperation and its replication at national, sub-regional and regional contexts. The results of such research should be widely circulated among academic and policy circles in the hope that it can help shape public policy.

Finally, the state in its current context across the majority of countries in the South is still largely predatory and vehemently opposed to any strategy that seeks to overturn the present power configuration between and among the major institutions. At the same, there are states that have exhibited features of a
developmental state. The challenge is how to democratize such fledgling developmental states. However, the reign of the retrogressive forces within the political leadership in the South is may be coming to an end as social and political movements, pro-democracy demonstrations, revolutions, strong civil society groups and coalition of opposition parties calling regime change and empowerment of the people in the political and development processes are on the rise. The message is increasingly becoming clearer to the hegemonic political leadership in the South and their supporters from the North that the revolutionary path holds the prospect of a democratic and developmental state in the South.
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