Introduction
The chapter problematizes the democratization agenda of the state in Nigeria and South Korea within the context of deconstructing the DDS. It argues that the state’s zero-sum politics blocks the process of democratizing development and the political parties from getting underway. It examines the history, leadership and governance of the political parties in both countries, taking note of the political contestations and internal democratic practices within and between the political parties. It looks critically at the manner in which the political parties were formed, disbanding, merged and regrouped, paying attention to the privatization of the parties by a few powerful and rich members, leaving the majority of the members of the parties politically disempowered.

The chapter recommends the need to democratize the governance of the entire development process and the political parties in particular; and to institute the democratization process through the creation of appropriate political spaces for civil society groups where they could act as a check on ambiguous and anti-people policies of the state and its inability to produce the public good. It recommends the formation of social, political and economic movements that can empower the people, groups and communities to pressurize the state to deliver on national development. In part, this is because such movements not only provide the platform for political parties with clearly defined ideologies of development and politics in the process, but imbue the members, the citizenry
and political institutions with democratic norms and practices. That way, the
democratization of the political parties will produce the political leadership with
a democratic culture that will help to facilitate the rise of the DDS in both countries.

Until the crisis that rocked South Korea’s economy in the late 1990s, the country’s
rapid economic growth was already taken as a development model for Nigeria
and Africa by scholars like Alice Amsden and Samuel Huntington, and by the
Bretton Woods Institutions and policy makers. There was so much focus on the
Korean state’s obsession with growth that no attention was given to its nature,
politics and democratization project, if it had any. Before the crisis, a comparison
between the two countries to examine the issue of development would have
been dismissed as irrelevant by many African scholars – as the author did in an
earlier work (Omoweh: 2005) – except if it were to draw lessons for Nigeria
from South Korea. The chapter further redresses such a misconception.

As noted in Chapter One, most of the discourses on the democratic
developmental state are largely comparative, although the majority of scholars
have not really developed paradigms to guide the researches either by direct
modelling or establishing rules and the limits of what is possible in such interro-
gative efforts. There is a need for creating a comparative paradigm that will capture
the various development trajectories of the Southern countries while formulating
the strategies for the emergence of a democratic, developmental state.

Chapter Three thus locates the discourse on blocked democratization as it
deconstructs the DDS and its feasibility in Nigeria and South Korea, using the
framework of Marxist political economy. The rationale for deploying this
approach, notwithstanding its limitations, resides in its capacity to establish the
dialectics of development and the common class traits in the political leaderships
of both countries. In this sense, it regards the history of Nigeria and South Korea
as a totality, in which the phenomenon of imperialism caused by British and
Japanese colonialism played a crucial role in shaping the present structure of the
political leadership, political parties, democratization and economic development
in both countries.

Further, the framework of inquiry recognizes the similarities and differences
in the political systems of Nigeria and South Korea as an intrinsic part of the
democratization project. For instance, Nigeria and South Korea operate a
presidential system of government, with the difference that Nigeria’s president
has a constitutional limit of two terms of four years each, its Korean counterpart
lays down a single term of five years. Whereas Nigeria’s National Parliament is
bicameral – the Senate and House of Representatives with proportional
representation – Korea’s legislature is unicameral with the majority of the seats
based on a single-member constituency with only a few candidates elected by
proportional representation. Korea’s electoral law permits independent candidates
to contest for elective positions; this contrasts sharply with the situation in Nigeria
where no such opportunity exists in the country’s electoral law. Both countries operate multiparty systems; the trend of two major political parties dominating the political landscape is common to them. First, it seems as well to discuss briefly some of the contradictions of the post-colonial state in Nigeria and South Korea.

The Antimony of the Authoritarian State and its Politics
In Nigeria, even though the political space has been marginally liberalized since May 29 1999, when Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration was inaugurated after a prolonged period of military rule, the Nigerian state has remained predatory, repressive and totalitarian. Politics is still zero-sum and brutish. The antecedents of the current state such as repression, predatory political behaviour and parasitism remain in place. Rather than democratize the polity and promote inclusive politics amid a complex plurality, the state continues to exclude more and more people from the political and development processes. The massively rigged general elections held in April 2007, with the attendant nullification of gubernatorial and parliamentary results by the election petition tribunals and the appellate courts, was indicative of the inability of the state to conduct credible elections after 47 years of political independence. It also gave useful insights into the depth of political decay in the country.

The vigour of the civil society groups and the pro-democracy activities mounted by the Civil Liberty Organization (CLO), the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR) and the National Coalition for Democracy (NADECO), the National Labour Congress (NLC) and National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) that chased the military from the political scene in the 1980s and mid-1990s has been extinguished since the onset of the civilian government in May 1999, partly because of the entry of their key members into partisan politics. The same is true of the majority of political activists who found participation in partisan politics more lucrative than forming political, social, economic and environmental movements to agitate for change and to pressurize the state to deliver public goods.

Worse still, the political elites have, on account of the kind of politics they play, not only alienated themselves from the people, but have been held hostage by them. Lacking in legitimacy, the political leadership resorts to bloody violence at all levels of political competition in order to remain in power. Coupled with the state managers’ tenuous relationship with production, politics has become the only lucrative business and the dominant means of accumulation in town. Hence, the political elites fight fiercely to penetrate the state, access its political power and retain it at all cost once it is captured.

While the process of forming and registering political parties has remained relatively open since 1999, the internal governance of the parties has hardly been liberalized. In fact, a few and rich politicians have captured and privatized the
political parties to meet their narrow gains, thereby re-orienting the parties away from their basic functions of interest articulation, aggregation and political education. As a result, political parties have become vehicles for power acquisition and surplus extraction. This has had dire consequences for internal democratic practices within the parties.

The Korean state’s approach to politics is not significantly different from its Nigerian counterpart in several ways. Politically, the autocratic Korean state still suffers from huge democratic deficits and weak political institutions. After over six decades of political independence, there is really nothing to suggest that the Korean political leadership is interested in democratizing the polity, economy and political parties. The level of political activism demonstrated by the labour unions, university teachers and student unionism in the late 1940s and 1950s, which resulted in the Kyonju massacre during which thousands of students, labour union members and academics were killed by the military and other state security operatives, has not been re-ignited in the country since the 1980s. In fact, Syngman Rhee, an academic who fled to the United States and was returned by the US government to be the country’s President after the end of the Korean War in 1954, could not reverse the Hobbesian politics of the Korean state.

Labour and student unionisms are well organized and resistant, but they are not really a countervailing force in the country’s body politic like their counterparts in Nigeria. Civil society groups are regularly cracked down on, and potential social, political and economic movements nipped in the bud by the state security agents. South Korea’s positioning as a bulwark for containing Sino-Russian extension of socialism into the southern Korean peninsula and Southeast Asia, coupled with the frosty relationship with its North Korean neighbour, reinforce the authoritarianism of the state and its undemocratic practices. The country’s geopolitics and the security implications for the peninsula have become an alibi for the state’s repressive policies and reluctance to open up the political space. This has further entrenched a tiny political class within the state that decides who will become the political actors and shapes the nature and outcome of political competition and development in the country. In such circumstances, the state remains unaccountable, as corruption deepens in the economy.

It is not surprising that the small number of rich, senior politicians benefit from the government that established political parties to reinforce their inordinate political ambitions. The parties’ manifestoes are no less a representation of the narrow world views and interests of the founders. The membership of parties remains closed. Even though the Koreans are a homogeneous group of people, they are extremely divided along the exploitative interests of the key founding members of the parties and key political leadership. The influential politicians and top bureaucrats have used their positions to carve out the country into spheres of
political interests and party strongholds, leaving other areas like the Chejudo islands as the underdogs and marginalized.

The Korean state’s economic development policy and programmes were in sharp contrast with Nigeria’s. By 1960, 15 years after South Korea gained political independence the Korean economy was still largely underdeveloped and had similar basic economic indicators to Nigeria’s. South Korea’s per capita income of US$95 was only slightly higher than Nigeria’s US$93. The economy was equally ridden with acute poverty and deepening social, political and economic crises.

By the late 1970s, South Korea’s economy grew at five percent annually. Coupled with its per capita income of US$3500, which continued into the early 1980s, the Korean state earned the status of a ‘late industrializer’, while suffocated under debt peonage and political and economic crises. Scholars like Byon-Nak and Amsden described South Korea as ‘Asia’s next giant’ and characterized the Korean state as developmental (Byon-Nak 1995; Amsden 1989).

However, contrary to the expectations of the majority of scholars, the chaebols or large conglomerates that ought to have been a major feature of the developmental state were seen by critics as South Korea Incorporated, because they provided safe havens for corrupt practices by a small group of politicians and government officials to accumulate wealth. South Korea’s rapid economic growth could not be sustained largely because of the lack of a virile indigenous business class and lagging democratization in the country’s development process. Samuel Huntington’s characterization of South Korea as possessing a ‘hard state’ and his recommendation that it be a model for the developing countries like Nigeria, crashed like a pack of card in the late 1990s (Huntington 1991). Korean society, like its Nigerian counterpart, is still strictly divided into two opposing classes: the rich and the poor, with the middle class completely wiped out (Omoweh 2005).

It can, therefore, be argued that the contradictions of the authoritarian state can impede the emergence of a democratic political leadership in both countries. Here it is useful to examine the extent of democratization of the development process generally and the political parties in particular. What is democratization? How is democratization blocked from taking roots in the political parties? What are the implications of all this for the prospects of the DDS in Nigeria and South Korea? These questions are dealt with in the rest of the chapter.

**Blocked Democratization**

Democratization is concerned with the empowerment of the people to participate effectively in the development process inclusive of politics. To democratize development entails the empowerment of the people to decide the kind of development they desire, which should be experiential. It allows the people to
participate, to implement and to renew the path to development. In doing so, the people become the agent, means and essence of development.

To democratize the polity entails creating a framework for a broad-based participation in politics inclusive of the opposition, in the hope that it allows the people to freely choose who governs them. It means the liberty of the people to exercise an oversight function on their representatives in government by making them account for their actions or inactions on issues that pertain to their wellbeing and the societal development. It is also necessary to democratize the opposition parties because they can act as a critical shadow government that plays the role of a watchdog towards the incumbent regime in order to promote good governance and participatory development. The democratization of the polity also involves the enthronement of democratic practices in the machinery of political parties. As a framework for political development, democratization promotes healthy political competition between and among political actors. It helps to sustain democratic political transition across governments over long periods.

In spite of the advantages of democratization, it is often found to be blocked. The process of democratization is blocked from taking roots in the overall development process, economy, the polity and the political parties, largely because the political elites resist democratization. It is not because the political elites are ignorant of its crucial role in deepening the democratic process and fostering people-centred development. On the contrary, the political elites dread democratization, largely because they equate the empowerment of the people in the development process to a reduction in the political power of the state managers. It is all the more so because of the state’s totalistic conception of politics, which prevents the process of democratizing politics and economic development from getting underway in the first place.

On account of the nature and politics of post-colonial states like Nigeria and South Korea, the concern is not really about democracy, but whether democratization is even on the agenda of the state managers. For the political elites only pay lip service to democracy while being vehemently opposed to the political empowerment of the people in whom the ultimate political power resides. All this significantly accounts for why the state can hardly embark on political reforms, inclusive of the political parties, that seeks to liberalize the process and bring about a substantive democratic change in the political leadership. The state only repositions its clients to occupy sensitive political positions both in government and political parties in order to retain its firm grip on political power and accomplish its limited social, economic and political interests and those of the institutions that make it a reality.

The contention that the democratization process is blocked does not foreclose the possibility of elections; nor does it mean halting the creation of political institutions like political parties and a parliament in Nigeria and South Korea. On
the contrary, the concern is about the state managers, who continue to recycle spent politicians and cronies in government, political appointments and in the leadership and machineries of the political parties. It is the unwillingness of the political leadership to open up the political space or set in motion a process that allows the people to actualize their inalienable rights that is at issue. An example of this tendency more broadly is the increasing trend for presidents of African countries to continue in office after serving out their term of office, and in so doing continue to decide who contests for top elective positions in government and political parties and who gets the plum political appointments (Southall & Melber 2006). Given such prevalent attitudes among political elites, the process of democratization can hardly take root in the polity and herein lies, in part, its crisis.

The Crisis of Democratization and Political Parties
There is a critical linkage between the level of internal democratization in the political parties and among national political leaders and the democratic developmental state. Democratization cannot survive in a country without democratized political parties. This is because party political leadership has first to imbibe democratic principles, values and practices, before such virtues are likely to spread throughout national political institutions. Strong political parties having profound internal democratic governance mechanisms and constructive inter- and intra-party relations are largely indicative of democratic growth and development.

Further, the kind of political parties and the capacity to conduct free and fair party elections gives a critical insight into the nature of the political leadership and the character of the democracy being built in the society. The level of intra- and inter-party democracy determines whether democratization is even underway in the first place. It gives an idea of the credibility of elections, democratic consolidation and renewal. It establishes the linkage between the political parties and the people.

The weakness of internal democratic practices within political parties dims the prospects for the DDS even in the more politically developed countries of the North. Chapter Four of this work sheds light on this with the experiences of Latin American countries.

Maurice Duverger had rightly noted that politicians formed the original political parties, which were called cadre parties, as their congressional caucuses became stable (Duverger 1954). John Aldrich elaborated on Duverger’s thesis, contending that political parties arose as politicians sought to gain office and pursue their goals. Further, with the increase in the size of the electorates, new ways were devised to overcome the problem of gathering electoral support and this led to the formation of mass parties (Aldrich 1995).
Political parties are formed to play the crucial roles of political recruitment, interest articulation and aggregation, political education and capacity building of the political leadership. But the majority of the political parties in the countries of the South have been unable to perform these functions credibly, due largely to the complex historical antecedents of the state and inadequate governance mechanisms.

In the colonial histories of Nigeria and South Korea, for instance, political parties were created as an instrument to facilitate either the transfer of power from colonial regimes to the local political elite; or they were formed by the local political leadership to fight colonialism. Once the colonial state was driven out, political parties degenerated into ethnic and regional groups, acting in most cases as the vanguard of local hegemonic forces to meet their narrow interests. In such circumstances, the people could not have been empowered to have any say in how the political parties were governed.

Further, the fledgling political parties were to face greater challenges as they were confronted with the need to choose among ideological positions that would guide their policy implementation. Swayed between the two ideological extremes of capitalism and socialism, political parties supported welfarist or conservative perspectives, depending on the preferences of founding members of the parties, but without sticking to any of them. Key leaders who provided finance to the parties cashed in on their leverage to occupy top political positions both in the parties and in government. The national leaders of the parties were, in most cases, the owners of the parties, whose interests and world views ultimately became the objectives, manifestoes, rules and regulations of the parties. Political parties were no less than the personal property of their leaders, who decided on who should a member. That way, membership of political parties was exclusive, and further reinforced the disempowerment of the people and their lack of ability to participate in party and national politics. Let me elaborate on these points by considering the examples of Nigeria and South Korea.

In Nigeria, under the First Republic, 1960-1966, there were three dominant political parties. The Action Group (AG), largely a Yoruba party, was led by Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba man, who doubled as the Premier of the Western region. The Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), regarded as Hausa-Fulani party, had its major base located in the North and was led by Ahmadu Bello, Premier of Northern region, a Fulani and descendant of Othman Dan Fodio, while Tafawa Balewa, also a Northerner, was the party’s deputy national leader and the Prime Minister of Nigeria. The National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) was the party for the Igbos, with Nnamdi Azikiwe, as its leader, who later became the President of Nigeria. That parties from the outset reflected the interests of the major ethnic blocs was itself an early threat to the democratization of the political parties.
Worse still, the ethnic basis of the parties facilitated the rise of autocratic and ethnic hegemonic leaders, who were unable to rise above ethnic agendas at both regional and national levels. This, in turn, further fragmented the leadership of the parties so much that the majority of the top politicians lacked the credentials to be a nation-wide leader able to appeal across ethnic divisions.

However, with the resumption of party politics in 1979, after a prolonged period of military rule from 1966, six major parties were formed, namely, National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP), Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP), National Advance Party (NAP) and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP). The national leaders of the parties were literally separated from the incumbents in government. For instance, Adisa Akinloye was the chairman of the ruling party, the NPN, while Shehu Shagari of the same party was the President of Nigeria. But the separation of such offices in the party did not translate into internal democratic practices, as the national, sub-national and local leadership and the machineries of the party were still undemocratic in the conduct of candidate selection, openness, rights of members, budgets and expenditures and gender issues.

This was indeed the case in the UPN, the major opposition party, where the national leader of the party, Obafemi Awolowo was simultaneously the de facto governor of the UPN-controlled states of Bendel, Oyo, Ogun and Ondo. There Awolowo liked to be seen to act as an ‘honest broker’ in the party, and whoever he anointed for office was not subject to opposition. In spite of the socialist inclinations of Mallam Aminu Kano, He acted in a similar way to Awolowo while founder, chairman and presidential flag bearer of the PRP. The same was true of Tunji Braithwaite of the NAP, who was the founder, chairman, financier and presidential candidate of the party during the 1979 and 1999 general elections. Thus the opposition parties could not constitute themselves into a formidable unified opposition.

The trend of undemocratic leadership structure that characterized political parties in the First and Second Republics continued into the Fourth Republic. Between 1999 and 2007, for example, 56 political parties were registered in Nigeria, with two major parties, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) dominating the political scene. Other political parties are the Action Congress (AC), All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), Labour Party (LP), and Peoples Progressive Party and Nigerian Advanced Party (NAP). Let me elaborate on the PDP.

Emerging as the largest political party in Africa, the PDP lacked internal democratic governance mechanisms. Olusegun Obasanjo, two-time President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999-2003 and 2003-2007), doubled as the national leader of the PDP and single-handedly appointed the national chairman
of the party. He was responsible for getting rid of the founding chairman of the party. He removed other members of the PDP’s board of trustees for daring to oppose his position on political issues. He replaced them with his surrogates who carried out his orders. The reporting line of the party was so designed that the decision of the national leader on party matters was final, leaving no room for other members of the party to oppose unpopular views. The choice of party candidates for elective positions and political appointments was the prerogative of the national leader.

Although factions existed within the party, they were not powerful and influential enough to unseat the national leader. The national leader decided the agenda and outcomes of the party primaries and conventions, and, in most cases, determined the winners before the votes were cast. The majority of the initial financiers of the party were virtually replaced by 2003 by the national leader. Faced with a cash crunch to finance his second term bid, he compelled the party to source funds from individuals and groups whose sources of wealth were questionable to complement monies generated by the PDP-controlled states. With the failure of the third term bid of Olusegun Obasanjo to continue in office after May 2007, he schemed to emerge as the chairman of the party’s Board of Trustees.

Equally, at the sub-national level, the governors of the PDP-controlled states were leaders of the party and they also wielded enormous political power. They would re-organize the executives of the party at their whim in order to nip in the bud all forms of opposition. Although various factions and their executives existed within the party, those that deferred to the group of the incumbent were, in most cases, in power. The undemocratic practices of the party at both national and state levels cascaded down to the council and ward levels of the party.

It is not only the PDP that lacked internal democratic mechanisms; rather, it is a trend that cuts across other political parties like the ANPP, AC, PPP and APGA where democratization was not really a consideration for the leaderships of the parties.

In South Korea, the approach by political elites to politics and the history of the parties was not very different to their counterparts in Nigeria. As noted, unlike in Nigeria, South Korea under the influence of the US was considered as a bulwark to stem the spread of socialism in the region. The South Korean political elite thus placed a high premium on national security. This influenced the perception and conduct of politics by the Korean state. Even though some Korean politicians, who had emerged during the period of Japanese colonialism and helped to mediate its economic interests in the post-colonial economy, opposed the overwhelming influence of the US policy in South Korea, security was high on the agenda. North Korea’s later acquisition of nuclear capacity raised the security stakes even higher in the Korean peninsula.
As security became a major priority in Korean politics and development, not only was it politicized by the political elites, but its politicization dimmed the prospect of any possibility for the democratization of the polity and of political parties. Security became an alibi for the majority of the political elites to perpetuate undemocratic practices as evident in the prevalence of inadequate democratic governance mechanisms.

In the early post-Second World War period, the major parties that arose were the Democratic Party (DP), Democratic Republican Party (DRP), and the Liberal Party (LP), established in 1948, 1949 and 1951 respectively. The DRP was in power under Park Chung-hee from 1963 and upon his death in 1978 and following the rule of Chun Doo-hwan in 1980, it was renamed Democratic Justice Party and later called Democratic Liberal Party under President Kim Young-sam in 1993. It was renamed New Korea Party in 1995 and the Grand National Party in 1997, following its merger with the Democratic Party.

Ideologically, the political parties were broadly either liberal or conservative. From the onset, the GNP was a conservative party and has sustained its ideological position. This contrasted sharply with Nigeria, where the ideological dispositions of political parties like the social welfare policy of the Action Group founded by Obafemi Awolowo could not be sustained among affiliates like the Alliance for Democracy (AD) after his demise.

Further, South Korea’s political parties are regionally-based and centred on important personalities who founded, financed, directed and owned the parties. Korea’s regional and party politics revolved around three major areas, the Southwestern Cholla region, otherwise known as Honam, the stronghold of the DP; the Southeastern Kyongsan region, referred to as Yongnam, which is the major base of the GNP; and the greater Seoul area, which is home for more than half of Korean electorate, which has the swing vote because it determines the success of the parties in any election.

Regional autocratic hegemons and their narrow interests framed the formation of political parties in South Korea. From the outset, the leadership of the political parties was not interested in creating political spaces to accommodate other politicians who were seeking elective positions in government. Nor has the Korean political leadership been able to create multiple-seat constituencies to cater for the interests of other politicians. As a result, the majority of politicians cross from one party to another with their members in search for political opportunities to realize their political ambitions. This has been a major concern not only for the electorate in Korea and for democratization of the political parties, but also for their counterparts in Nigeria.

Between 1948 and 2008, over 60 political parties were formed, disbanded, merged and participated in Korean politics, but only nine political parties contested the elections held in August 2008. Of the nine parties, two parties were dominant,
namely, the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) led by Park Hee-tae; and the Democratic Party (DEP) with Chung Sye Kyun as leader. The GNP was the de facto ruling party until 2007. Other parties were the Liberty Forward Party (LFP) led by Lee Hoi-chang, who was the presidential nominee of the GNP in 1997/2002, but defected to launch the LFP. The Pro-Park Coalition (Park) had Suh Chung-won as its leader; the Creative Korean Party (CKP) was led by Moon Kook-hyun, and the New Progressive Party (NPP) led by Roh Hoe-chan, which was a split from the Democratic Labour Party. A number of independent candidates also stand for office.

To all appearances, South Korean political parties were weak, lacked internal democratic practices and became vehicles for surplus accumulation by politicians. The political leaders only used the political parties to build an army of followers that was disempowered and could not succeed them. The resultant implosion of the parties caused splinter groups to form their own parties to actualize their political ambitions. But that further disenfranchised the majority of the people from participating in party politics, because the newly formed parties were too weak to recruit members besides those they decamped with.

That is not all. The opposition parties and their internal politics can vary but they remain uniformly undemocratic. Yet it is not the case that party politics among African and Asian polities is merely an extension of a larger, all-inclusive family, nurtured by the traditional political culture. For even within the single party system, the party leadership was undemocratic.

Worse still, the majority of the political leaders in the opposition have, on an account of their narrow political, social and economic interests, either reconciled with the old order or crossed the floor, taking with them their parties and membership. All this has further reduced opposition politics to the politics of survival. Let me elaborate on this.

In Nigeria, Mohammed Buhari, the presidential candidate of the major opposition party the ANPP in the April 2007 election, had appealed to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Tribunal that endorsed Umaru Yar’ Adua as President of Nigeria and legitimately elected under the ticket of the PDP. This was in spite of Yar’ Adua’s admission that the election was not free and fair. Ironically, the President proposed a government of national unity (GNU) to accommodate the interests of the opposition, as the GNU has become a framework for legitimizing fraudulent elections in Africa. (Another example of this trend is President Moi Kibaki’s unity government in Kenya. His opponent Raila Odinga was the acclaimed winner of the 2008 general election, but after the bloody post-election violence which claimed thousands of lives, a government of national unity was formed with Odinga forced to accept second position as Prime Minister.)
The President of Nigeria had invited the ANPP to nominate candidates for consideration by the government, but Buhari declined the offer. However, the national chairman of the ANPP, Ume Ezeoke, one-time Speaker of the Federal House of Representative, objected to Buhari’s decision, insisting that the party should participate. When the Yar’ Adua-led government requested the ANPP to suggest names for consideration, Ezeoke reportedly nominated himself. Even when his name was turned down by the government, he suggested his son for possible consideration. Again, it was rejected.

The issue, therefore, is not really whether the political elite is faced with sticking to an alleged tradition of a political system that did not permit much acknowledged opposition, or that they fear a clash of civilization, culture and interests. On the contrary, those who are in opposition are not significantly different from their counterparts in government. Both share the common interest of capturing the state’s instrument of political power for selfish social and economic gains. Thus there is even the possibility that the weak leadership of the opposition parties could slide Nigeria into a single party state in spite of the huge potential for a robust opposition.

In South Korea, the same trend of a weak opposition and the practice of floor-crossing by politicians was established. For instance, the Liberty Forward Party led by Lee Hoi-chang broke away from the GNP after he failed to secure the presidential ticket in the 1997/2002 elections. Hoi-chang moved from the party with his members, a trend that is similar to the practice in Nigeria, where an incumbent governor in Bauchi State defected from the ANPP on whose ticket he won, to the PDP.

South Korea’s National Legislature was weakened by the overwhelming control of the seats by the GNP, a long-time conservative opposition party before it recently won the presidential election. The two dominant parties, GNP and DP, had acquired the notoriety of not cooperating with each other while the other was in power. Little wonder that the DP, the major opposition, took a hard-line position against the GNP. Even within these two major political parties, the prospects of new entrants fulfilling their political ambitions were slim, as the top leadership of the two organizations usually handpicked candidates for elected positions without giving members the liberty to vote. The lack of democratization within the political parties exacerbated the zero-sum politics of South Korea’s body politic.

Concluding Remarks: Any Prospect for the DDS?

From all indications, the feasibility of the DDS in Nigeria and South Korea given the nature of the political leadership is doubtful. It is all the more so because the process of democratization has not even started among political parties. The polity cannot be democratized without the political parties internalizing a democratic
ethos and the parties cannot play the crucial role of educating, raising and nurturing democratic political leadership if they are not democratic in thought and action.

While the steps that could be taken to bring about a truly democratic developmental state are implicit in the preceding analysis, it might be useful to put forward some explicit recommendations regarding the democratization of governance in the entire development process generally and political parties in particular.

First, civil society organizations (CSOs) should be brought into the heart of the process of democratizing development and politics. Only such independent bodies offer the hope of acting as a check on the obnoxious and ambiguous policies of the state and its failure to deliver the public good. The CSOs can also backstop the political parties in order to instil elements of democratic practices in their governance machineries. Practically, a coalition of CSOs can mount pro-democracy demonstrations to protest the state’s glaringly undemocratic approach to politics, the decay in infrastructure, and the irrelevance of the political leadership to the actual conditions of the people. Groups similar to the Pastor Tunde Bakare-led Save Nigeria Group (SNG), could be created to protest the state’s reluctance to compile a new voters register for the April 2011 elections in Nigeria. Such groups could lend their weight to reforms such as the liberalization of registration of political parties. It is imperative to revitalize the seemingly docile CSOs such as the CLO, CD, CDHR and NADECO whose protracted agitation chased the military out of the political scene between 1988 and 1993.

Second, there is the urgent need for labour unions and student groups to re-radicalize and fight the deepening corruption and undemocratic practices in public institutions and the political parties in South Korea. The historic Kyonju massacre was a mark of prolonged resistance to the autocratic state by students, labour and academics in the 1950s, and indicates that the potential for sustained opposition goes deep in the South Korean political heritage.

Third, it recommends the creation of movements that would empower the people, groups and communities to form social, political and environmental movements on critical development issues. These movements can provide a credible platform for the formation of political parties. Once the leadership and members of a movement imbibe basic elements of democratic governance such as openness, accountability and responsiveness, they would have been prepared for training and nurturing the political parties that could spring from such movements. That way, it would be more difficult for opportunistic politicians to hijack parties to actualize personal gains.

Fourth, there is the need for the movements to be transformed into a countervailing social and political force to check the repressive state and its injustices to the people. The state’s policies and politics in the natural resource sector in
Nigeria are clearly undemocratic. The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), created by a group of activists in the region, has sought to redress the situation. MEND is aimed at actualizing the resource rights of the people in the region after three decades of ruthless exploitation by the state and foreign oil capital. The activities of MEND crippled Nigeria’s oil exports under then Yar’ Adua’s government and the Movement is watching closely the implications of the impending Petroleum Industry Bill for the Delta region before it takes the next step. The resource control movement could have been another formidable force to confront the predatory Nigerian state, but it lacked coordination and collapsed.

Fifth, it suggests the need to establish a Special Court for Electoral Crimes. This Special Court would bring to trial and sentence politicians found guilty of election rigging and the manipulation of the electoral process, together with the requirement that repayment the monies acquired in office be repaid to the public purse. Also, such political parties should be prohibited from once again putting forward candidates whose election was nullified in the re-run. This will stem the woeful trend of having the Appeal Courts nullify the election of the governors of PDP-controlled states of Ondo, Ekiti and Osun in the 2007 election, only to have the same personnel declared the winners of the gubernatorial elections in these states in 2010. The Labour Party reclaimed Ondo in 2009 after the illegitimate PDP government was in power for over a year while Action Congress of Nigeria won Ekiti and Osun States after the PDP was in government for a three-quarters of the four year tenure. Yet the ousted governors who stole the mandate of the people were not punished.

Sixth, this analysis suggests that there is a need for a truly autonomous national electoral body that is solely responsible for the conduct of elections. The head of such a body should be appointed by the national legislature and its funding charged to the national account. Not only would all this help to insulate the electoral umpire from the influences of top politicians and the leaders of political parties, but would help energize the process of democratization and reformation of the state.

Clearly, the factions and groups within the political leadership that benefit enormously from the current structure of the state in Nigeria and South Korea will resist democratization. But the contradictions thrown up by the policies and politics of the state and the leadership of the parties are reviving pro-democracy agitations and revolutionary tendencies across Latin America and Africa countries. There seems to be only one path for the post-colonial state in Nigeria and South Korea, and that is to democratize the development process or risk mass action and revolution. Discussion of this topic is taken further in Chapter Four.
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